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The Legal Implications under Federal Law when
States Enact Biology-Based Transgender Bathroom
Laws for Students and Employees
Marka B. Fleming*
Gwendolyn McFadden-Wade**
. . . It is essential for [students and] employees to be able to [go to
school and] work in a manner consistent with how they live the rest
of their daily lives, based on their gender identity.*

I. INTRODUCTION
Gavin Grimm, a transgender1 boy, sued the Gloucester High School in
Gloucester, Virginia, because the school board adopted a policy that
prevented him from using the boy’s bathroom.2 The newly adopted policy
required all students to use the bathroom based on their biological sex
rather than their gender identity.3 The case reached the United States Court
* * J.D., Associate Professor of Business Law, North Carolina A & T State University.
*J.D., LL.M., CPA, Associate Professor of Accounting, North Carolina A & T State
University.
* Best Practices: A Guide to Restroom Access for Transgender Workers, available at
https://www.osha.gov/Publications/OSHA3795.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2017).
1. For purposes of this article, the term “‘transgender’ is an umbrella term for persons
whose gender identity, gender expression or behavior does not conform to that typically
associated with the sex to which they were assigned at birth. And, “gender identity refers to
a person’s internal sense of being male, female or something else.” AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION.ORG, available at http://www.apa.org/topics/sexuality/trans
gender.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 2017).
2. G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 7026 (4th Cir. Apr. 19,
2016); see also, Richard Fausset, Appeals Court Favors Transgender Student in Virginia
Restroom Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2016, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/
20/us/appeals-court-favors-transgender-student-in-virginia-restroom-case.html (last visited
Sept. 29, 2017).
3. G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 7026 at *9 (4th Cir. Apr.
19, 2016).
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of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 2016. Citing a violation of Title IX of
the Education Amendments Act of 1972, a federal statute prohibiting
federally funded educational programs from discriminating against or
denying benefits to individuals based on their sex,4 the appellate court held
the school board’s actions were illegal.
Gloucester High School is not the only educational institution to
require students to use the bathroom based on the student’s biological sex.5
Ashton Whitaker, a transgender high school senior, was informed by the
Kenosha Unified School District in Kenosha County Wisconsin that he
could not use the boy’s bathroom.6 In response, Ashton filed a lawsuit to
enjoin the school from: (1) enforcing any policy that denies the him access
to the boy’s restroom at school and school-sponsored events; (2) taking any
formal or informal disciplinary action against him for using the boy’s
restroom; (3) using, causing or permitting school employees to refer to the
him by his female name and female pronouns; and (4) taking any other
action that would reveal the his transgender status to others at school.7 The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin heard the
case and concluded that Ashton had shown a likelihood of success on the
merits of the case. A preliminary injunction was issued.8
Educational institutions, such as the secondary schools in the
previously cited cases, are regulated by Title IX yet they are by no means
unique in their effort to restrict the use of bathrooms by transgender
individuals. Employers have required employees to use the bathroom
based on their biological sex.9 In response, transgender individuals have
4. Id. at *29–31; see also, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
5. See e.g., Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified High Sch., No. 16-CV-943-PP, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 129678 (Sept. 22, 2016) (granting a preliminary injunction to a transgender
male whose high school prevented him from using the male’s restroom); Doe v. Reg’l Sch.
Unit 26, 86 A.3d 600, 603 (Me. 2014) (holding that a school’s actions of denying a
transgender female student the right to use the girl’s restroom violated the Maine’s Human
Rights Act); see also, Ivey DeJesus, Transgender Bathroom Rights and Nondiscriminatory
Laws are about to Top State Issues in Pa., PENNLIVE, May 17, 2016, available at
http://www.pennlive.com/news/2016/05/bathroom_bills_non-discriminat.html (last visited
Sept. 29, 2017) (“ In recent weeks two Philadelphia suburban school districts adopted
comprehensive policies addressing the rights of transgender students. . . . The same
conversation is happening in at least two other school districts—the Pine-Richland School
District in Allegheny County and the Lower Merion School District, in Montgomery
County.”); Letitia Stein, In U.S. Bathroom Battles, Florida Transgender Student Fights for
Equality, REUTERS, Apr. 20, 2016, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-lgbtstudents-idUSKCN0XH0YQ (last visited Oct. 17, 2017) (“For 17-year-old transgender male
Nate Quinn, using the bathroom at school became a battle. The Florida high school student
was barred last year from using the boys’ restroom.”).
6. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified High Sch., No. 16-CV-943-PP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
129678 (Sept. 22, 2016).
7. Id. at *10–11.
8. Id.
9. See e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that
transsexuals is not a protected class under Title VII and the employee failed to allege a sex
stereotyping claim when a transgender employee’s employer failed to allow him to use the
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defended their rights to use the bathroom of their choice often by citing
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a federal statute that prohibits
employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of “race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”10 For example, in 2002, a
transgender female adjunct instructor in Avondale, Arizona, sued her
employer, the Estrella Mountain Community College, claiming the
community college violated her Title VII rights.11 The lawsuit arose after
the community college prevented her from using the women’s bathroom
“until such time as she provided proof that she did not have male
genitalia.”12
Likewise, in 2004, the Utah Transit Authority fired a transgender
female bus driver after she merely asked to use the women's bathroom.13
The employer’s decision to terminate prevailed when, three years later, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit determined that Title
VII had not been violated.14
The aforementioned cases raise the question: what legal rights do
transgender individuals have to use the bathroom of their choice? Clearly
these rights are directly affected by the school and employer policies, but
more importantly there is a veiled issue of discrimination that quietly looms
in the shadows. The discrimination issue surfaces when, as in the
aforementioned cases, bathroom policies based solely on biological sex,
purposefully emerge and restrict the use of these facilities by transgender
individuals.15 Is the right to use the bathroom of one’s choice a relevant
issue? Is it a timely issue? Is the issue politically charged? At the federal
level, the issue has been discussed, addressed, packaged and settled only to
be unpacked again. At the state level, the issue has been debated, almost
legislated in several states but is certain to remain afloat because of deep
rooted public opinion, the probability of litigation and the question of
whether restrictive bathroom policies violate federal statutes.
This article focuses on the transgender bathroom issue at the state level
and provides insight into the attempts by states to turn policy into law.
First, the article surveys a sample of contemporary transgender bathroom
legislation, proposed or adopted by states throughout the country.
Afterwards, it discusses several federal cases in which courts addressed the
woman’s restroom); Goins v. West Grp., 635 N.W.2d 717, 720 (Minn. 2001) (holding that
denying a transgender female the right to use the female restroom did not violate
Minnesota’s Human Rights Act).
10. See id.; see also, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
11. Kastl v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. College Dist., No. CIV 02-1531-PHX-SRB, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 29825 (D. Ariz. June 2, 2004).
12. Id.
13. See Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).
14. See id.
15. See generally, Vincent J. Samar, Article, The Right to Privacy and the Right to Use
the Bathroom Consistent with One’s Gender Identity, 24 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 33
(2016); Brian Eisner, Article, Being a Transgender Student: An Uphill Fight for Equality,
28 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 419 (2016).
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legality of biology-based transgender bathroom laws in the public
educational and employment sectors.
Next, it explores the legal
implications to be considered by states when determining whether to base
their individual state law on biology or gender identity. Finally, the article
concludes by arguing that transgender bathroom laws, if enacted, should be
based on an individual’s gender identity. Such a result would address the
discrimination issue and reduce potential liability for state agencies and
other government entities.

II. MODERN APPLICATIONS OF TRANSGENDER
BATHROOM LAWS
Numerous state governments have wrestled with the question of a
transgender individual’s use of public bathrooms based on biology or
gender identity and have proposed laws to allow or restrict such use.16 For
purposes of this article, the term “gender-identity based” bathroom laws
refers to those laws that base a person’s right to use a public bathroom or
public facility on the gender with which the person identifies. The term
“biology-based” bathroom laws refers to those laws that base a person’s
right to use a public bathroom or public facility on the individual’s
biological sex. Only a handful of states have been proactive in enacting
bathroom laws specific to transgender individuals by granting them the
right to use the bathroom based on gender identity. Conversely, several
states vehemently oppose this position, but a lack of legislation, is
revealing.
A. STATE-ENACTED GENDER-IDENTITY BASED LAWS
A few states, eight to be exact, and the District of Columbia, have
enacted laws specifically protecting the rights of students and employees to
use public bathrooms and facilities based on their gender identity.17 The
short list includes: California, Colorado, Delaware, Iowa, New Jersey,
Oregon, Vermont, and Washington.18 In these jurisdictions, the law is
16. See infra notes 18-88.
17. See D.C. Code Mun. Regs. tit. 4 § 802 (2018); (last visited Sept. 29, 2017) (“In order
to meet the obligations to prohibit discrimination based on gender identity or expression as
set forth in the Act, the Office and the Commission adopt this chapter . . . “[t]o implement
the provisions of the Act regarding discrimination based on gender identity or expression in
employment, housing, public accommodations, or educational institutions, including all
agencies of the District of Columbia government and its contractors.”); see also,
Transgender People and the Law, ACLU, available at https://www.aclu.org/know-yourrights/transgender-people-and-law (last visited Sept. 29, 2017).
18. See CA Dep’t of Fair Employment & Housing, DFEH Issues Guidance for California
Employers on Transgender Employees, (2017), available at https://dfeh.ca.gov/wp-content/
uploads/sites/32/2017/06/LozanoPR20160217.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2017) (“Under
California law, all employees have the right to use restroom and locker room facilities that
correspond to their gender identity.”); S.B. 08-200, 66th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess., (Co.
2008) (enacted); Colorado Civil Rights Commission Rules and Regulations, §3 CCR 708-1
(2014); State of Delaware Guidelines on Equal Employment Opportunity and Affirmative
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education/student specific, employment specific, or a combination of both.
For example, California’s School Success and Opportunity Act (“SSOA”),
enacted in 2013, was a transgender bathroom law based on gender identity,
specific to students.19 This act “requires that a pupil be permitted to
participate in sex-segregated school programs and activities, including
athletic teams and competitions, and use facilities consistent with his or her
gender identity, irrespective of the gender listed on the pupil’s records.”20
The state had already enacted a law specific to employment ten years
earlier.
The Fair Employment and Housing Act of 2004 (“FEHA”), made it
illegal for all California employers “with 5 or more employees to fire, fail
to hire or discriminate against employees who are perceived to be
transgender or gender non-conforming.”21 The law applied to both private
and public employers in California.22 To clarify the application of the law,
in February 2016, the California Department of Fair Employment and
Action Gender Identity Guidelines, available at http://www.delawarepersonnel.com/po
licies/documents/sod-eeoc-guide.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2017) (“An employee whose
gender identity does not match his or her assigned sex at birth, including a transitioning
employee, will have access to the gender-specific facilities (including restrooms) that
corresponds to his or her gender identity, beginning when the employee first begins
presenting in accordance with such gender identity.”); Iowa Code §216.2 (2017) (covering
both students and employees and defining the term “‘gender identity’ as a gender-related
identity of a person, regardless of the person’s assigned sex at birth”); S.B. 3067, 217th
Leg., Reg. Sess., (N.J. 2017) (introduced) (“The Commissioner of Education shall develop
and distribute to school districts guidelines concerning transgender students . . . The
guidelines developed by the commissioner shall include, but not be limited to, information
and guidance regarding the following: use of restrooms and locker rooms, including not
requiring a transgender student to use a restroom or locker room that conflicts with the
student’s gender identity, and providing reasonable alternative arrangements if needed to
ensure a student’s safety and comfort.”); Guidance to School Districts: Creating a Safe and
Supportive School Environment for Transgender Students, Oregon Department of Education
(2016), available at http://media.oregonlive.com/education_impact/other/Transgender%20
Student%20Guidance%205-5-16.pdf (last visited July 24, 2017); Sex, Sexual Orientation
and Gender Identity: A Guide to Vermont’s Anti-Discrimination Law for Stores,
Restaurants, Schools, Professional Offices and Other Places of Public Accommodation,
State of Vermont Human Rights Commission, available at http://hrc.vermont.gov/sites/hrc/
files/publications/trans-pa-brochure.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2017) (“The Human Rights
Commission interprets the law to require that an individual be permitted to access restrooms
in accordance with his/her gender identity, rather than his/her assigned sex at birth.”); A
Guide to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity and the Washington State Laws Against
Discrimination, Washington State Human Rights Commission, available at http://www.
humwa.gov/media/dynamic/files/162_Updated%20SO%20GI%20Guide.pdf (last visited
Sept. 29, 2017) (“If an employer maintains gender-specific restrooms, transgender
employees should be permitted to use the restroom that is consistent with the individual’s
gender identity.”).
19. A.B. 1266, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Ca. 2013) (enacted).
20. Id. (emphasis added.); see also, Emeline Garcia, Note, AB 1266: The School Success
and Opportunity Act or a Violation of the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 35 U. LA VERNE
L. REV. 243 (2004).
21. Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov. Code §12940.
22. See id.
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Housing issued guidance for California employers.23 A press release made
it “clear that employers must allow transgender employees access to
bathrooms, showers, locker rooms and other such facilities that correspond
with their gender identity.”24
Similarly, Colorado provides both transgender students as well as
employees with the right to use public bathrooms or facilities based on
their gender identity in S.B. O8-200.25 The Colorado general assembly
enacted the law to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation,
including transgender status.26 Thereafter, the Colorado Association of
School Boards, the Colorado Association of School Executives, the
Colorado Education Association, and One Colorado27 collaborated to
devise a document entitled Guidance for Educators Working with
Transgender and Gender NonConforming Students stating that the
“preferred practice is to allow students access to the bathroom or locker
room that corresponds to their gender identity consistently asserted at
school.”28
Additionally, Rule 81.11 of the Colorado Code of Regulation required
employers to allow transgender employees to use the bathroom based on
their gender identity.29 In part, the law states that: “All covered entities
shall allow individuals the use of gender segregated facilities that are
consistent with their gender identity” and “[g]ender segregated facilities
include but are not limited to, bathrooms, locker rooms, dressing rooms and
dormitories.”30

23. See California Department of Fair Housing & Employment February 17, 2016, News
Release, supra note 19.
24. Id.
25. See, S.B. 08-200, 66th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess., (Co. 2008)(enacted)
26. Id.
27. “One Colorado is the state’s leading advocacy organization dedicated to advancing
equality for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) Coloradans and their
families.” ABOUT US, ONE COLORADO.ORG, available at http://www.one-colorado.org/
about-us/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2017).
28. This guidance specifically, stated that in schools the “preferred practice is to allow
students access to the restroom or locker room that corresponds to their gender identity
consistently asserted at school.” The school, in determining a student’s access to restroom,
is advised to consider the following factors: (1) the student’s age; (2) the student’s
preferences (including his or her need or desire for privacy); (3) any relevant medical needs;
(4) the location of facilities in proximity to the student’s classes and schedule; (5) the design
and layout of the facilities; (7) the age and nature of the other students; (8) the student’s
maturity level; and (9) behavior or disciplinary history. See Guidance for Educators
Working with Transgender and Gender NonConforming Students, available at https://cdpsd
ocs.state.co.us/safeschools/Resources/One%20Colorado/OneCO%20Transgender_Guidance
.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2018).
29. §3 CCR 708-1 of Colorado Civil Rights Commission Rules and Regulation Rule
81.11.
30. See supra note 29.
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B. STATE-ENACTED BIOLOGY-BASED LAWS
Conversely, between 2013 and 2017, approximately twenty-four states
considered enacting transgender bathroom laws to restrict the use of public
bathrooms to the individual’s biological sex.31 Interestingly, Colorado is
on this list, notwithstanding the state’s 2008 legislation.32 A biology-based
transgender bathroom bill was introduced into the Colorado state
legislature in 2015.33 However, like the fate of similar bills proposed in
other states, the Colorado bill died in committee by a vote of 7 to 4.34
Like Colorado, other states have considered enacting biology-based
transgender bathroom legislation. The states of Arizona, Florida, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Mississippi, Nevada, New York, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia,
Washington, and Wisconsin are among those possibly motivated by gallant
intent.35 Proponents of these laws argue that the public’s safety is at risk
31. Bathroom Bill Legislation: Overview of State Legislation, National Conference of
State Legislatures, Aug. 30, 2016, available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/bathroom-bill-legislative-tracking635951130.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 2017).
32. See H.B. 15-1081, 70th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess., (Co. 2015) (“Notwithstanding
any other provisions of this section, it is not a discriminatory practice for a person to restrict
admission to a place of public accommodation to individuals of one sex if: . . . the place of
public accommodation is a sex-segregated locker room and the restriction is based on an
individual’s actual, biological sex.”); see also, Joey Bunch, Locker Room Privacy Bill
Called Unfair to Transgender People Dies, DENVER POST, Feb. 4, 2015, available at
http://www.denverpost.com/2015/02/04/locker-room-privacy-bill-called-unfair-totransgende
r-people-dies/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2017).
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See S.B. 1045, 51st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Az. 2013) (introduced); H.B. 583, Leg.,
Reg. Sess, (Fl. 2015) (died in judiciary committee) (“Single-sex public facilities designated
for females shall be restricted to females. . . . Single-sex public facilities designated for
males shall be restricted to males.”); H.B. 4474, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Il. 2016)
(session sine die)(“Requires a school board to designate each pupil restroom, changing
room, or overnight facility accessible by multiple pupils simultaneously, whether located in
a public school building or located in a facility utilized by the school for a school-sponsored
activity, for the exclusive use of pupils of only one sex. Defines “sex” as the physical
condition of being male or female, as determined by an individual’s chromosomes and
identified at birth by that individual’s anatomy.”); H.B. 1079, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (In.
2016) (as introduced by Rep. Timothy Harman) (Single sex facility trespass. Makes it a
Class B misdemeanor if: (1) a male knowingly or intentionally enters a single sex facility
that is designated to be used only by females; or (2) a female knowingly or intentionally
enters a single sex facility that is designated to be used only by males.); S.B. 35, 119th Gen.
Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess., (In. 2016) (introduced) (“Single sex facilities. Provides that
student facilities in school buildings must be designated for use by female students or male
students, and may be used only by the students of the biological gender for which the
facility is designated. Makes it a Class A misdemeanor if: (1) a male knowingly or
intentionally enters a single sex public facility that is designed to be used by females; or (2)
a female knowingly or intentionally enters a single sex public facility that is designed to be
used by males.”); H.B. 2737, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Ks. 2016)(died in committee)
(created the student physical privacy act and providing, among other things, that “[i]n all
public schools and postsecondary educational institutions in this state, student restrooms,
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locker rooms and showers that are designated for one sex shall be used only by members of
that sex. “Sex means the physical condition of being male or female, which is determined
by a person’s chromosomes, and is identified at birth by a person’s anatomy.”); S.B. 513,
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Ks. 2016) (died in committee) (created the student physical
privacy act); H.B. 364, Gen. Assemb., 16 Reg. Sess., (Ky. 2016) (introduced) (Created “new
sections of KRS Chapter 158 to ensure that student privacy exists in school restrooms,
locker rooms, and showers; require students born male to use only those facilities designated
to be used by males and students born female to use only those facilities designated to be
used by females”); H.B. 542, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (La. 2016) (introduced) (stating that
“[e]mployers may designate restrooms based on sex and may restrict the use of such
facilities to only those employees, contract workers, customers, and visitors whose sex
designated at birth corresponds to the designation of the restroom” and the term “[s]ex
means the sex assigned to a person at birth.”); H.B. 1320, 189th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.,
(Ma. 2015) (“Access to lawfully sex-segregated facilities, accommodations, resorts, and
amusements, as well as educational, athletic, and therapeutic activities and programs, shall
be controlled by an individual’s anatomical sex of male or female, regardless of that
individual’s gender identity.”); H.B. 5717, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Mi. 2016)
(introduced) (“A bill to restrict the use of public bathrooms, changing facilities, and similar
shared spaces used for private activities based on biological sex.” . . . “‘Biological sex’”
means physical condition of being male or female, as stated on the individual’s birth
certificate or a state-issued identification card.”); S.B. 993, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Mi.
2016)(introduced) (“A restroom, locker room or shower that is located in an elementary or
secondary school under the control of the board or board of directors, is designated for pupil
use, and is accessible by multiple pupils at the same time shall be designated for and used
only by pupils of the same biological sex.” . . . “As used in this section, ‘biological sex’
means the physical condition of being male or female as determined by a person’s
chromosomes and anatomy as identified at birth.”); H.F. 3396, 89th Leg., Reg. Sess., (Mn.
2016) (introduced) (“Other than single-occupancy facilities, no employer shall permit access
to restrooms, locker rooms, dressing rooms, and other similar places on any basis other than
biological sex.”); S.F. 3002, 89th Leg., Reg. Sess., (Mn. 2016) (introduced) (“Other than
single-occupancy facilities, no employer shall permit access to restrooms, locker rooms,
dressing rooms, and other similar places on any basis other than biological sex.”); H.B.
1258, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ms. 2016) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section,
it shall be unlawful for a person to knowingly and intentionally enter into restroom facilities
or other bath facilities that were designed for use by the gender opposite the person’s gender
at birth.”); H.B. 1847, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess., (Mo. 2016) (“All public
restrooms, other than single occupancy restrooms, shall be designated as gender-divided
restrooms.”); H.B. 2303, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess., (Mo. 2016) (“No student of
the female sex shall use a student bathroom or student changing room that has been
designated by the school district for the exclusive use of the male sex, and no student of the
male sex shall use a student bathroom or student changing room that has been designated by
the school district for the exclusive use of the female sex.” The term “sex” under this bill is
defined as “the physical condition of being male or female, as identified at birth by an
individual’s anatomy.”); S.B. 720, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess., (Mo. 2016) (“Every
public school restroom, locker room and shower room designated for student use and which
is accessible by multiple students at the same time shall be designated for and used only by
students of the same biological sex.” The term “biological sex” under the bill is defined as
“the physical condition of being male or female, which is determined by a person’s
chromosomes, and is identified at birth by a person’s anatomy and indicated on their birth
certificate.”); A.B. 375, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Nov. 2015) (a bill requiring “any school
facility in a public school, including a restroom, locker or shower which is designated for
use by persons of one biological sex must only be used by persons of that biological sex as
determined at birth.”); S.B. A10127, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (N.Y. 2016) (introduced)
(“The board of trustees of the state university of New York and the trustees of the city
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university of New York are authorized to promulgate rules or policies requiring every state
university of New York and city university of New York, including all their constituent
units including community colleges, to ensure that multiple occupancy bathrooms or
changing facilities that are designated for use, be designated for and used only by persons
based on their biological sex. For purposes of this section, the following definitions apply:
(a) ‘Biological sex’ shall mean the physical condition of being male or female, which is
stated on a person’s birth certificate.”); H.B.2, Gen. Assemb., 2nd Extra Sess., (N.C. 2016)
(repealed) (“An Act to Provide for Singe Occupancy Bathroom and Changing Facilities in
Schools and Public Agencies and Create Consistency in Regulation of Employment and
Public Accommodations.”); S.B. 1014, 55th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess., (Ok. 2016) (introduced)
(“It shall be unlawful for a person to use a gender specific restroom when that person’s
biological gender is contrary to that of the gender); H.B.1008, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.,
(S.D. 2016) (vetoed) (“Every restroom, locker room, and shower room located in a public
elementary or secondary school that is designated for student use and is accessible by
multiple students at the same time shall be designated for and used only by students of the
same biological sex. In addition, any public school student participating in a school
sponsored activity off school premises which includes being in a state of undress in the
presence of other students shall use those rooms designated for and used only by students of
the same biological sex.” The term “biological sex” under this bill “means the physical
condition of being male or female as determined by a person’s chromosomes and identified
at birth by a person’s anatomy.”); H.B. 2414, 109th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Tn. 2016)
(died in chamber) (“Public schools shall require that a student use student restroom and
locker room facilities that are assigned for use by persons of the same sex as the sex
indicated on the student’s original birth certificate. . . . Public institutions of higher
education shall require that a student use the restroom and locker room facilities that are
assigned for use by persons of the same sex as the sex indicated on the student’s original
birth certificate.”); H.B. 663, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Va. 2016) (failed) (“The Director
of the Department shall develop and implement policies that require every restroom
designated for public use in any public building on property that is owned, leased, or
controlled by the Commonwealth . . . and that is designated for use by a specific gender to
solely be used by individuals whose anatomical sex matches such gender designation. . . .
Local school boards shall develop and implement policies that require every school
restroom, locker room, or shower room that is designated for use by a specific gender to
solely be used by individuals whose anatomical sex matches such gender designation.” The
term anatomical sex under this bill “means the physical condition of being male or female,
which is determined by a person’s anatomy.”); H.B. 781, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Va.
2016) (defeated) (a bill titled Restroom facilities; use of facilities in public buildings or
schools, definition of biological sex.); H.B. 2589, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess., (Wa. 2016)
(introduced) (“Nothing in this chapter prohibits a public or private entity from limiting
access to a private facility segregated by gender, such as a bathroom, restroom, toilet,
shower, locker room, or sauna, to a person if the person is preoperative, nonoperative, or
otherwise has genitalia of a different gender from that for which the facility is segregated.
Nothing in this chapter grants any right to a person to access a private facility segregated by
gender, such as a bathroom, restroom, toilet, shower, locker room, or sauna, of a public or
private entity if the person is preoperative, nonoperative, or otherwise has genitalia of a
different gender from that for which the facility is segregated.”); H.B. 2782, 64th Leg., Reg.
Sess., (Wa. 2016) (introduced) (“This act may be known and cited as the Washington
gender privacy protection act.”); H.B. 2941, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess., (Wa. 2016) (introduced)
(“Schools must provide toilets and restroom facilities for each sex with no disparities based
on sex. Each school must provide facilities to be used separately by each sex. Schools may
provide a gender-neutral single occupant bathroom to accommodate a student’s privacy
concerns. “Sex” as used in this section means biological sex or sex assigned at birth.”); S.B.
6548, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess., (Wa. 2016) (introduced) (“AN ACT Relating to allowing the
use of gender-segregated facilities”); A.B. 469, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Wi. 2015) (failed
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when transgender individuals are allowed to use the bathroom based on
their gender identity.36 Specifically their argument suggests that men,
disguised as women, would intentionally invade the women’s bathroom
with the ultimate purpose of raping women.37 Conversely, opponents of
biology-based laws argue that the laws unlawfully discriminate against
transgender individuals.38
Among states, biology-based bathroom laws are by no means generic
in language. Some proposed laws were restricted to secondary and postsecondary schools only.39 For example, in Kansas, the legislature, through
House Bill 2737 and Senate Bill 513, proposed creating “the student
physical privacy act.”40 Specifically, these bills provided that: “In all
public schools and postsecondary educational institutions in this state,
student bathrooms, locker rooms and showers that are designated for one
sex shall be used only by members of that sex.”41 And, the term “sex"
under these bills “means the physical condition of being male or female,
which is determined by a person's chromosomes, and is identified at birth
by a person's anatomy.”42 Furthermore, the bill gave a student the right to
sue the school for monetary damages if the school gave a person of the
opposite sex “permission to use the facilities of a different sex or the school
to pass) (“This bill requires a school board to designate each pupil restroom and changing
room (together, changing room) located in a public school building and accessible by
multiple pupils as for the exclusive use of pupils of only one sex. The bill defines ‘sex’ as
the physical condition of being male or female, as determined by an individual’s
chromosomes and identified at birth by that individual’s anatomy.”); S.B. 582, Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Wi. 2015) (failed to pass) (“This bill requires a school board to
designate each pupil restroom and changing room (together, changing room) located in a
public school building and accessible by multiple pupils as for the exclusive use of pupils of
only one sex. The bill defines ‘sex’ as the physical condition of being male or female, as
determined by an individual’s reproductive organs and as designated on that individual’s
birth certificate.”).
36. See Erin Beck, Transgender Predator Myth Affects Lives in W.Va., CHARLESTON
GAZETTE-MAIL, pg. P1B, May 8, 2016 (“if cities and states pass laws that ban
discrimination in public places rapist will put on dresses, sneak into women’s restrooms,
and assault women and children); see also, Jeff Brady, When a Transgender Person Uses
the Restroom Who is at Risk?, NPR, May 15, 2016, available at http://www.npr.org/2016
/05/15/477954537/when-a-transgender-person-uses-a-public-bathroom-who-is-at-risk (last
visited Oct. 4, 2017).
37. See Beck, supra note 37.
38. See Katy Steinmetz, Everything You Need to Know About the Debate Over
Transgender People and Bathrooms, TIME, July 28, 2015, available at http://time.com/3974
186/transgender-bathroom-debate/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2017); see also, Brady supra note 37.
39. See e.g. H.B. 2737, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Ks. 2016) (died in committee); S.B.
513, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Ks. 2016) (died in committee); H.B. 364, Gen. Assemb., 16
Reg. Sess., (Ky. 2016) (introduced); H.B. 5717, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Mi. 2016)
(introduced); S.B. 993, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Mi. 2016) (introduced); S.B. A10127,
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (N.Y. 2016) (introduced).
40. H.B. 2737, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Ks. 2016) (died in committee); S.B. 513, Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Ks. 2016) (died in committee).
41. See id.
42. See supra note 40.
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failed “to take reasonable steps to prohibit such use.”43 Both of these bills,
however, failed to pass and died in committee on June 1, 2016.44
Other contemplated transgender bathroom laws were intended to
govern public employees within a state.45 For example, Louisiana House
Bill 542, pre-filed46 with the Louisiana House of Representatives on March
3, 2016, was drafted to provide rights for employers on issues regarding
transgender individuals.47 The bill stated that “[e]mployers may designate
bathrooms based on sex and may restrict the use of such facilities to only
those employees, contract workers, customers, and visitors whose sex
designated at birth corresponds to the designation of the bathroom.”48 The
bill was withdrawn the next day and never reached the House.49
Comparably, South Carolina’s Senate Bill 1203, introduced into the
state’s senate on April 6, 2016, provided that “[m]ultiple occupancy
bathrooms and changing facilities located on public property, including but
not limited to property owned by the State, its authorities, commissions,
departments, committees or agencies, or any political subdivision of the
State, shall be designated for and only used by a person based on his
biological sex.”50 As stated, this bill would encompass both public
employers and public schools.51 The bill was referred to the General
Committee on the same day that it was introduced. It had not been enacted
as of October 2017.52
Other states have gone a step further by proposing to criminalize the
use of public bathrooms if used by someone inconsistent with his or her
biological sex.53 Notably, Indiana’s House Bill 1079 was introduced in the
state’s House of Representatives on January 5, 2016, and proposed to make
it a “Class B misdemeanor if: (1) a male knowingly or intentionally enters a
single sex facility that is designated to be used only by females; or (2) a
female knowingly or intentionally enters a single sex facility that is
designated to be used only by males.”54 This bill, like those proposed in

43. Id.
44. See id.
45. See e.g., H.B. 542, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (La. 2016) (introduced); G.B. 1203,
121st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2016) (introduced).
46. The term prefile has been defined as “the ability to introduce a measure before the
opening of the session.” Glossary of Legislative Terms, National Conference of State
Legislatures, available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/glossary-oflegislative-terms.aspx (last visited Oct. 4, 2017).
47. See, H.B. 542, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (La. 2016) (introduced).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. G.B. 1203, 121st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (S.C. 2016) (introduced).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See e.g., H.B. 1079, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (In. 2016) (as introduced by Rep.
Timothy Harman); H.B. 1258, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Ms. 2016).
54. H.B. 1079, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (In. 2016) (as introduced by Rep. Timothy
Harman).
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other state legislations before it, failed to pass.55
Likewise, Mississippi’s House Bill 1258 stated: “[e]xcept as otherwise
provided in this section, it shall be unlawful for a person to knowingly and
intentionally enter into bathroom facilities or other bath facilities that were
designed for use by the gender opposite the person's gender at birth.”56
And, anyone found in violation of the provisions was subject to
prosecution.57 The law failed to pass on February 23, 2016. Refusing to be
crushed by this defeat, in April 2016, the state passed a law specifically
defining a man and a woman based on the “individual’s immutable
biological sex as objectively determined by anatomy and genetics at the
time of birth.”58 Three months after this law was enacted, a federal judge
struck it down.59
1. North Carolina’s Biology-Based Transgender Bathroom Law
Despite the numerous states that have contemplated enacting biologybased transgender bathroom laws, currently the only state to have actually
enacted such a law is North Carolina.60 On March 23, 2016, former
Governor Pat McCrory signed into law the Public Facilities Privacy &
Security Act, commonly known as House Bill 2 (“HB-2”).61
55. Id.
56. H.B. 1258, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Ms. 2016)
57. Id.
58. See H.B. 1523, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Ms. 2016).; see also, Emma Green,
America’s Profound Gender Anxiety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 31, 2016, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/americas-profound-gender-anxiety/484
856/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2017); Avianne Tann, Mississippi Religious Freedom Bill, ABC
News, Apr. 6, 2016, available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/mississippis-religious-freedombill-sweeping-anti-lgbt-law/story?id=38170420 (last visited Oct. 4, 2017).; Neely Tucker,
U.S. District Judge Strikes Down Mississippi’s Religious Freedom Law, WASH. POST, July
1, 2016, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/us-district-judge-strik
es-down-mississippis-religious-freedom-law/2016/07/01/f98dc2ca-3ec9-11e6-a66faa6c1883
b6b1_story.html?utm_term=.f176c9772cd2 (last visited Oct. 4, 2017).
59. Id.
60. H.R. 2 Gen. Assemb., 2nd Extra Sess., 2016-3 (N.C. 2016); see also, Carcaño v.
McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615 (M.D.N.C. June 6, 2016).
61. In November 2014, almost two years before this law was enacted, the Charlotte,
North Carolina, City Council began considering a proposal to amend the city’s
nondiscrimination ordinances to prevent discrimination on the basis of “marital status,
family status, sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression.” Approximately,
four months later, on March 2, 2015, the proposed ordinance was modified to include the
following language: “Notwithstanding the foregoing, this section shall not, with regard to
sex, sexual orientation, gender identity and gender expression, apply to restrooms, locker
rooms, showers, and changing facilities.” However, the proposed ordinance failed to pass
by a vote of six to five. Thereafter, in February 2016, the Charlotte City Council considered
a new proposal to its nondiscrimination ordinance, which added “marital status, familial
status, sexual orientation, gender identity and gender expression” to the list of protected
characteristics. But, this time the proposed ordinance did not contain exceptions for
bathrooms, showers or other similar facilities and it repealed prior rules that exempted
“‘restrooms, showers rooms, bathrooms and similar facilities.” This newly proposed
ordinance, which “regulated places of public accommodation and businesses seeking to
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HB-2 targeted government agencies within the state by specifically
providing that: “‘Public agencies’ shall require every multiple occupancy
bathroom or changing facility to be designated for and only used by
persons based on their biological sex.”62 And, the term “biological sex”
was defined under the law as “the physical condition of being male or
female, which is stated on a person’s birth certificate.”63 In effect, this bill
prevented all public agencies from allowing transgender individuals to use
public bathrooms that are consistent with their gender identity.64 The term
public agencies included (1) “[a]ll agencies, boards, offices, and
departments under the direction and control of a member of the Council of
State”; (2) “[a] local board of education”; (3) “[t]he judicial branch”; (4)
“[t]he legislative branch”; and (5) “[a]ny other political subdivision of the
State.”65 Clearly and purposefully, North Carolina’s HB-2 was enacted to
directly affect the lives of both transgender students attending public
institutions in North Carolina and transgender employees working for the
state.66
HB-2, however, had a much deeper impact because it provides that
“the regulation of discriminatory practices in places of public
accommodation is properly an issue of general, statewide concern, such
that this Article and other applicable provisions of the General Statutes
supersede and preempt any ordinance, regulation, resolution, or policy
adopted or imposed by a unit of local government or other political
subdivision of the State.”67 In essence, through HB-2, the state legislature
vested itself with sole authority to regulate on matters related to
discrimination in places of public accommodation. Local and state
agencies were stripped of their ability to regulate—as many had previously
done—or to override the state law on this matter.68
Following the enactment of HB-2 and in response to it, Margaret
Spellings, the President of the University of North Carolina (“UNC”)
system, sent a memorandum to all of its Chancellors indicating that
“University institutions must require every multiple-occupancy bathroom
and changing facility to be designated for and used only by persons based
contract with Charlotte,’ passed by a vote of seven to four. After the adoption of Charlotte’s
new ordinance, the North Carolina General Assembly, who was not scheduled to reconvene
until April 25, 2016, convened a special session one month early to vote on HB-2. The
same day that the special session was convened the law passed the House by a vote of
eighty-four to twenty-five; passed the Senate with all Republicans unanimous supporting the
law while the Democrats walked out in protest; and was signed into law by the governor.
H.R. 2 Gen. Assemb., 2nd Extra Sess., 2016-3 (N.C. 2016); see also, Carcaño v. McCrory,
203 F. Supp. 3d 615 (M.D.N.C. June 6, 2016).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. H.R. 2 Gen. Assemb., 2nd Extra Sess., 2016-3 (N.C. 2016).
66. H.R. 2 Gen. Assemb., supra note 65.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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on their biological sex.”69
Shortly thereafter, on May 4, 2016, a little over a month after North
Carolina enacted HB-2, the United States Department of Justice sent a
letter to former Governor McCrory indicating that North Carolina’s law
violated, among other things, Title IX and Title VII.70 The letter indicated
that through compliance and implementation of the law, North Carolina “is
engaging in a pattern and practice of discrimination against transgender
state employees.”71 On the same day, the Department of Justice also sent a
letter to Spellings reiterating that HB-2 was illegal and stating that, as a
recipient of federal financial assistance, the UNC system must comply with
Title IX, and, as an employer, the system must comply with Title VII.72
Both letters gave the respective recipients until May 9, 2016, to remedy the
situation.73
Rather than complying with the Department of Justice’s request, North
Carolina filed a lawsuit against the federal government on May 9th,
requesting that the court declare HB-2 legal.74 The lawsuit was filed in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.75 In
response, and in a different district court, the Department of Justice filed a
similar lawsuit against North Carolina, challenging the legality of HB-2.
Its petition was filed in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina.76 Subsequently, on September 16, 2016, North
Carolina dismissed its lawsuit against the federal government citing
“substantial costs to the State.”77
In addition to the federal lawsuit filed by the Justice Department, an
69. See Memorandum from Margaret Spellings on Compliance with the Public Facilities
Privacy & Security Act to Chancellors (Apr. 5, 2016), available at https://www.northcaroli
na.edu/sites/default/files/public_facilities_guidance_memo_0.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2017).
70. See Letter from U.S. Department of Justice to Governor Pat McCrory (May 4, 2016),
available at http://media.charlotteobserver.com/static/images/misc/HB2050412.pdf (last
visited Oct. 7, 2017).
71. See supra note 71.
72. See Letter from U.S. Department of Justice to President Margaret Spellings, Thomas
C. Shanahan & University of North Carolina Board of Governors (May 4, 2016), available
at http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/article75647942.ece/BINA
RY/Read:%20DOJ%20letter%20to%20UNC (last visited Oct. 7, 2017).
73. See id.
74. See McCrory v. U.S., No. 5:16-cv-00238-BO (E.D.N.C. filed May 9, 2016) available
at http://media2.newsobserver.com/content/media/2016/5/9/Complaint%20McCrory%20V
%20USA.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2017).
75. See id.
76. See U.S. v. State of N.C., No. 5:16-cv-00238-BO (E.D.N.C. filed May 9, 2016)
dismissed; available at http://media2.newsobserver.com/content/media/2016/5/9/Complai
nt%20McCrory%20V%20USA.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2017).
77. See Rebecca Hersher, North Carolina Governor Drops Bathroom Lawsuit Against
U.S., NPR, Sept. 19. 2016, available at http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/09/19
/494573314/north-carolina-governor-drops-bathroom-bill-lawsuit-against-u-s (last visited
Oct. 7, 2017); see also, McCrory Drops House Bill 2 Lawsuit, Cites Costs, ABC11.COM,
Sept. 18, 2016, available at http://abc11.com/politics/mccrory-drops-house-bill-2-lawsuitcites-costs/1516428/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2017).
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action was brought against the state in the case of Carcano v. McCrory. In
Carcano, North Carolina was sued by several transgender plaintiffs,
including two transgender students and one employee, alleging that HB-2
violated: (1) Title VII, (2) Title IX, (3) the Due Process Clause and (4) the
Equal Protection Clause.78 Additionally, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of HB-2 until their
lawsuit was settled.79 The lawsuit was filed in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. In August 2016, the
federal judge granted the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction,
thereby blocking the enforcement of HB-2 while their lawsuit was
ongoing.80
As a result of HB-2, the state had to brace itself against the strong
waves of negative backlash. Corporations and celebrities boycotted the
state.81 PayPal canceled its decision to open an office in the state.82
Deutcsche Bank abandoned its plans to add hundreds of new jobs in the
state.83 The National Basketball Association and the National College
Athletic Association decided to move their sports games, traditionally
scheduled and played in North Carolina, to venues outside the state.84

78. Carcaño v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615 (M.D.N.C. June 6, 2016).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 622–23. (“After careful consideration of the limited record presented thus far,
the court concludes that the individual transgender Plaintiffs have made a clear showing that
(1) they are likely to succeed on their claim that Part I violates Title IX, as interpreted by the
United States Department of Education (“DOE”) under the standard articulated by the
Fourth Circuit; (2) they will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3)
the balance of equities weighs in favor of an injunction; and (4) an injunction is in the public
interest.”); see also, Corinne Segal, UNC cannot Enforce Part of HB-2, Federal Judge
Rules, PBS, Aug. 27, 2016, available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/transgend
er-unc-hb-2-injunction/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2017) (“A federal judge has blocked the
University of North Carolina from enforcing part of the state’s recent law that limits
bathroom use by transgender people, adding that the plaintiffs “are likely to succeed on their
claim” that the law is discriminatory.”).
81. See Amber Phillips, The Legal Effect of North Carolina’s Transgender Bathroom
Law in 4 Questions, WASH. POST, May 9, 2016, available at https://www.washington
post.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/05/09/the-legal-fight-over-north-carolinas-transgender-bath
room-law-explained-in-4-questions/, (last visited July 28, 2016).
82. See, Paypal Withdraws Plans for Charlotte Expansion over HB2, THE CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Apr. 5, 2016, available at http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/business
/article70001502.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2017); citing HB2, Paypal Cancels Planned
Charlotte Expansion, WRAL, Apr. 5, 2016, available at http://www.wral.com/citing-hb2paypal-cancels-planned-charlotte-expansion/15621787/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2107).
83. See Steven Benen, NCAA Joins Backlash Against North Carolina’s Anti-LGBT Law,
MSNBC, Sept. 13, 2016, available at http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/ncaajoins-backlash-against-north-carolinas-anti-lgbt-law (last visited Oct. 7, 2017) (“[NCAA
officials] announced on Monday evening that they will relocate all of their championship
events scheduled to take place in North Carolina due to the controversial HB2 law. . .”); see
also, Scott Jaschik, NCAA Moves Championship from North Carolina, INSIDE HIGHER ED,
Sept. 13, 2016, available at https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/09/13/ncaa-willmove-championship-games-north-carolina (last visited Oct. 7, 2017).
84. See Emma Margolin, NBA Pulls All-Star Game Out of Charlotte, NBC NEWS, July
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In an attempt to diminish the negative impact of HB-2, on March 20,
2017, North Carolina’s newly elected governor, Governor Roy Cooper,
signed into law House Bill 142 (“HB-142), commonly referred to as a
“compromise bill”, which repealed some parts of HB-2.85 Specifically,
HB-142 repealed the provision of HB-2 that required individuals to use
public bathrooms or facilities based on their biological sex.86 However,
HB-142 retained, until December 2020, the portion of HB-2 that prohibited
state agencies and local governments from regulating, on their own, access
to multiple occupancy bathrooms and facilities.87 That authority remained
with the state legislature, thereby paralyzing the authority of state agencies
and local governments to regulate on this matter.

III. LEGAL CASES EXAMINING BIOLOGICAL-BASED LAWS
When states enact transgender bathroom laws based on a student’s or
an employee’s biological sex, legal questions arise under federal law; are
the biology-based transgender bathroom laws discriminatory?88 Plaintiffs
21, 2016, available at http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/nba-pulls-all-star-gameou
tcharlotte-over-hb2-n614466 (last visited Oct. 7, 2017); see also, Marc Tracy & Alan
Blinder, N.C.A.A. Moves Championship Events from North Carolina, Cites Anti-Gay-Rights
Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2016, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/13/sports/
ncaa-moves-championship-events-from-north-carolina.html?r=0 (last visited Oct. 7, 2017);
Scott Cacciola & Alan Blinder, N.B.A. to Move All-Star Game from North Carolina, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 2016, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/sports/basketball/n
ba-all-star-game-moves-charlotte-transgender-bathroom-law.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2017).
85. In November 2016, Democrat candidate Roy Cooper won the North Carolina
gubernatorial election and beat the incumbent Republican candidate Pat McCory. See North
Carolina Gov. McCory Concedes Governor’s Race, CBS NEWS, Dec. 5, 2016, available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/pat-mccrory-north-carolina-governor-concedes-roy-cooper/
(last visited on July 26, 2017); see also, H.R. 142 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (N.C. 2017)
[hereinafter North Carolina House Bill 142]; see also, Jason Hanna, Madison Park & Eliott
C. McLaughlin, North Carolina Repeals Bathroom Bill, CNN, Mar. 30, 2017, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/30/politics/north-carolina-hb2-agreement/ (last visited July
19, 2017) (“North Carolina lawmakers on Thursday passed a bill that repeals the state’s
controversial bathroom law in a move meant to end a year of tumult that saw businesses
leave and major sporting events and concerts canceled.”); Daniella Silva, HB2 Repeal:
North Carolina Overturns Controversial ‘Bathroom Bill’, NBCNEWS, Apr. 2, 2017,
available at http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/hb2-repeal-north-carolina-legislaturevotes-overturn-controversial-bathroom-bill-n740546 (last visited July 19, 2017) (“A deal
that North Carolina lawmakers reached to repeal the state’s controversial and costly
‘bathroom bill’ passed on Thursday after a contentious debate—but the compromise has left
LGBTQ advocates exasperated, with some calling it ‘shameful’ and an ‘outrageous
betrayal.’”).
86. See North Carolina House Bill 142, supra note 86.
87. See id.; see also, Hanna, Park & McLaughlin, supra note 86 (“LGBTQ and civil
rights advocates have called for a full repeal of the bill, and denounced the new compromise
over provisions they say will still allow for discrimination: namely a three-year ban on local
nondiscrimination ordinances.”).
88. While scope of this article is limited to federal claims, it should be noted that there
have been a small number of cases instituted against schools and employers based on state
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commonly assert that the law violates either Title IX and/or Title VII.89
A. THE TITLE IX CLAIM- EDUCATION

Title IX provides that “[n]o person shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.”90 The law forbids discrimination by educational
institutions based on certain characteristics, such as sex.91 To allege a
violation of Title IX based on sex discrimination, the plaintiff must show
that: (1) he or she was excluded from participation in an education program
because of his or her sex; (2) the educational institution was receiving
federal financial assistance at the time of his or her exclusion; and (3) that
the improper discrimination caused the plaintiff harm.92 A review of two
federal cases highlights the issue.
1. Johnston v. University of Pittsburg of the Commonwealth System of
Higher Education
The issue of whether Title IX is violated when a transgender student is
denied the right to use the bathroom because of a biology-based policy was
raised in the case of Johnston v. University of Pittsburg of the

claims for biology-based transgender bathroom laws implemented for students and
employees. The state cases have focused on whether these biology-based transgender
bathroom laws violate state statutes prohibiting discrimination against individuals based on
their gender identity or expression. See e.g., Reg’l Sch. Unit 26, 86 A.3d at 603; Mathis v.
Fountain Fort Carson School District 8, No. P20130034X at 10–11 (Colo. Div. of Civil
Rights June 17, 2013), available at http://www.transgenderlegal.org/media/uploads/d
oc529.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2017) (the Colorado Civil Rights Division held that a school
discriminated against a transgender female student when it denied her the right to use the
girl’s restroom); Goins, 635 N.W.2d at 717; cf. Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of the
Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F. Supp. 3d 657 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (After granting a
university’s motion to dismiss on federal claims, the court declined to exercise jurisdiction
over a transgender student’s state claim that a university violated his rights under the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act by prohibiting him from using the male restroom.);
Roberts v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 215 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1015 (D. Nev., Oct. 4, 2016)
(holding that the employer actions of banning a transgender employee from the men’s and
women’s restroom violated Nevada’s Anti-Discrimination Statute codified as N.R.S.
613.330, which prevents discrimination based on gender identity).
89. It should also be noted that when a transgender student or employee is denied the
right to use the restroom based on his or her gender identity, this individual may also choose
to bring an equal protection claim or a due process claim. See e.g., Johnston, 97 F.Supp.3d
at 672 (holding that a transgender student who was denied the right to use the restroom
based on his gender identity failed to state a cognizable claim for relief under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Carcano v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d
615 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 26, 2016) (a case where students and a faculty member brought equal
protection and due process claims after being denied the right to use the restroom based on
their gender identity).
90. 20 U.S.C.S §1681(a).
91. Id.
92. Cannon v. University of Chicago et al., 441 U.S. 677, 691 (1979).
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Commonwealth System of Higher Education.93 In Johnston, the plaintiff,
Seamus Johnston, born biologically female, understood his gender identity
as a male at the early age of nine.94 In May 2009, Seamus transitioned
completely from female to male by holding himself out as a male in all
parts of his life including: (1) amending his gender marker to male on his
Pennsylvania license; (2) changing his name to a male name; (3) registering
with the Selective Service; (4) amending the gender marker on his United
States passport to male; and (5) amending the gender marker to male on his
Social Security record.95
From 2009 to 2011, Seamus attended the University of Pittsburgh at
Johnstown as an undergraduate Computer Science major.96 Although in
March 2009, on his application for enrollment at the university, he listed
his sex as female,97 during his entire tenure at the university Seamus held
himself out as a male. In August 2011, Seamus requested that the
university change the gender marker to male on his school records.98
While enrolled at the university, he consistently used the men’s bathroom
on campus and even registered for a men’s weight training class during the
spring 2011 semester.99 As a student in this class, he used the men’s locker
room.100
In September 2011, a university official informed Seamus that he could
no longer use the men’s locker room without a court order or a new birth
certificate reflecting his gender as a male.101 Nonetheless, Seamus
continued to use both the men’s bathroom and locker room, and after
receiving several citations, on December 2, 2011, the university held a
disciplinary hearing.102 At the hearing, Seamus was sanctioned and found
guilty of violating the student code of conduct.103 Despite these sanctions,
Seamus continued to use the men’s facilities. Subsequently, he was
expelled from the school, and later filed a lawsuit against the university.104
In his complaint, Seamus asserted that the university discriminated
against him in violation of Title IX “because of his sex, including his
transgender status and his perceived failure to conform to gender
stereotypes.”105 The university’s response asserted that Seamus failed to
state a cognizable action because Title IX does not prevent discrimination

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d 657 (2015).
Id. at 662.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 662–63.
Id. at 663.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 664.
Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 664.
Id.
Id. at 672.
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on the basis of gender identity.106 To support their position, the university
cited Title IX, which it claims does not mention gender identity, gender
expression, or gender transition.107 Additionally, the university argued that
Seamus’s allegations did not constitute sex stereotyping, which, if proven,
would render the university’s action discriminatory.108
The court in Johnston agreed with the university and determined that
Seamus failed to state a cognizable claim for discrimination under Title
IX.109 In reaching this conclusion, the court held that the university’s
policy that required students to use sex-segregated bathrooms and locker
rooms based on their biological sex, did not violate Title IX’s prohibition
against sex discrimination.110
The court reached this finding
notwithstanding the fact that it cited no federal court cases where this
specific issue was addressed.111 Instead, the court relied on federal court
decisions that had traditionally held that transgender status is not a
protected characteristic under Title VII.112 Namely, the Johnston court
cited the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s holding in
Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., in which the Eighth Circuit concluded
that the term “sex” in Title VII should be given the traditional definition of
male and female, rather than an expansive meaning which would include
transgender status.113 Influenced by the Eighth Circuit’s decision, the court
in Johnston concluded that Title IX does not provide protection for
transgender status.114
Next, the court in Johnston addressed Seamus’ claim that the university
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.; see also, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
109. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 672.
110. Id. at 672–73.
111. Id. at 674.
112. Id. at 672 (citing Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221-22 (10th Cir.
2007) (denying a transgender employee’s Title VII claim)); see also, Ulane v. E. Airlines,
742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984) (“While we do not condone discrimination in any form,
we are constrained to hold that Title VII does not protect transsexuals.”); Sommers v.
Budget Marketing, Inc. 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (“Because Congress has not
shown an intention to protect transsexuals, we hold that discrimination based on one’s
transsexualism does not fall within the protective purview of the Act.”); Lopez v. River
Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Group, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653, 658 (S.D. Tex. 2008);
(“Courts consistently find that transgendered persons are not a protected class under Title
VII per se.”) Sweet v. Mulberry Lutheran Home, No. IP02-0320-C-H/K, 2003 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 11373 at *2 (S.D. Ind., June 6, 2003) (“Sweet’s intent to change his sex does not
support a claim of sex discrimination under Title VII because that intended behavior did not
place him within the class of persons protected under Title VII from discrimination based on
sex.”); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 305 (D.D.C. 2008) (“What makes
Schroer’s sex stereotyping theory difficult is that. when the plaintiff is transsexual, direct
evidence of discrimination based on sex stereotypes may look a great deal like
discrimination based on transsexuality itself, a characteristic that, in and of itself, nearly all
federal courts have said is unprotected by Title VII.”).
113. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 676; see also, Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750.
114. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 676.
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violated Title IX because it illegally engaged in sex stereotyping by
denying him the right to use the men’s bathroom and locker room.115 The
U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins first
articulated a claim for sex stereotyping.116 In Price Waterhouse, the
plaintiff, a non-transgender female accountant, was denied partnership in
the accounting firm because she failed to conform to the gender stereotypes
of a female.117 Several reasons were advanced for failure to promote.118
For example, she was seen as “macho” and she was “overcompensated for
a woman”. Additionally, it was said she needed to take “a course at charm
school” and used too much profanity for a female.119 After reviewing the
case, the Supreme Court rendered a landmark decision when it held that
employment discrimination based on sex stereotypes constitutes sex
discrimination under Title VII.120 The Johnston Court, however, found the
allegations proffered by Seamus were insufficient to state a claim under a
sex stereotyping theory.121
The court noted that Seamus had not alleged that the university
discriminated against him because of the way he looked, acted or spoke,
and specifically, “he did not behave, walk, talk, or dress in a manner
inconsistent with any preconceived notions of gender stereotypes.”122
Rather, the court found that Seamus merely alleged that the university
refused to allow him the use the bathroom based on his gender identity.123
The court determined that merely denying an individual to use the restroom
based on his or her gender identity does not constitute sex stereotyping.124
2. G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board
The 2016 high profile case of G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board
involved a transgender high school male student who brought a Title IX
claim against a school for requiring him to use the bathroom based on his
biological sex.125 In Gloucester, the plaintiff, Gavin Grimm, was
diagnosed with gender dysphoria.126 He underwent hormone therapy
115. Id. at 680.
116. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
117. Id. at 278.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 676.
122. Id. at 681.
123. Id.
124. The court emphasized the fact that Johnston never alleged that the university harassed
or discriminated against him because of his transgender status. Also, the court noted that
the university had allowed Johnston to live as a male in all aspects of his life with the
exception of allowing him to use the men’s bathroom and men’s locker room. Id. (citing
Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir.2007)).
125. 822 F.3d. 706, 713, 715 (4th Cir. 2016).
126. “Gender dysphoria (formerly Gender Identity Disorder) is defined by strong,
persistent feelings of identification with the opposite gender and discomfort with one’s own
assigned sex that results in significant distress or impairment. People with gender dysphoria
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beginning in his freshman year in high school at which time he legally
changed his name to Gavin.127 He lived all aspects of his life as a boy, but
did not undergo sex reassignment surgery.128
Before his sophomore year began, Grimm and his mother told school
officials that he was a transgender boy.129 School officials were supportive
and took steps to make sure teachers and staff treated him as a boy.130 In
this supportive environment, Grimm requested that school officials allow
him to use the boy’s bathroom, and the school officials granted him
permission.131 Grimm used the boy’s bathroom without incidence for
approximately seven weeks.132 When his use of the boy’s bathroom
became known by others in the community, the Gloucester County School
Board (“the Board”) was contacted in an effort to prevent Grimm from
continuing to use the boy’s bathroom.133
At a school board meeting, held December 9, 2014, by a vote of 6-1,
the Board adopted a new school policy. The policy read in part:
It shall be the practice of [Gloucester County Public Schools] to
provide male and female bathroom and locker room facilities in its
school, and the use of said facilities shall be limited to the
corresponding biological genders, and students with gender
identity issues shall be provided an alternative appropriate private
facility.134
The Board also indicated it would update school bathrooms to improve
student privacy and it would, among other things, construct single-stall
unisex bathrooms available to all students.135 Nevertheless, this newly
adopted policy was unsatisfactory because it precluded Grimm from using
the boy’s bathrooms.136 Although unisex bathrooms were available to
Grimm under this policy, he did not find them to be a suitable alternative
because they made him “feel even more stigmatized . . . and being required
to use the separate bathrooms set him apart from his peers, and serve[d] as
a daily reminder that the school view[ed] him as ‘different.’”137 As a result,
on June 11, 2015, Grimm sued the Board seeking a preliminary injunction

desire to live as members of the opposite sex and often dress and use mannerisms associated
with the other gender.” Id. (citing Gender Dysphoria, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (2017), https://
www.psychologytoday.com/conditions/gender-dysphoria (last visited Oct. 17, 2017)).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d. 706, 713, 715 (4th Cir. 2016).
132. Id. at 715–16.
133. Id. at 716.
134. Id.
135. G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d. at 716.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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to allow him to use the boy’s bathroom.138
The district court held a hearing on Grimm’s motion for a preliminary
injunction on July 27, 2015, and also on the Board’s motion to dismiss
Grimm’s lawsuit.139 At the hearing, the district court orally dismissed
Grimm’s Title IX claim, followed by written orders dated September 4,
2015, and September 17, 2015, respectively, denying the injunction and
dismissing Grimm’s Title IX claim.140 In its September 17, 2015, order,
the district court’s rationale was clear. Title IX prohibits discrimination on
the basis of sex not on the basis of other concepts such as gender identity or
sexual orientation.141 The district court concluded that Grimm was female
and that requiring him to use the female bathroom did not impermissibly
discriminate against him on the basis of sex, which, if proven, would be in
violation of Title IX.142
Grimm appealed to the United States Court of Appeals requesting
reversal of the district court’s dismissal of his Title IX claim.143 In support
of Grimm’s appeal, the United States filed an amicus brief in order to
defend the federal government’s interpretation of Title IX as requiring
schools to provide transgender students access to bathrooms congruent with
their gender identity.144 On appeal the United States Court of Appeal
reversed the district court’s dismissal of the case.145 The court’s rationale
for the reversal is circular but noteworthy.146
In the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the majority opinion relied
heavily on the Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights
interpretation of the law and used the Department of Education’s
interpretation as its basis of understanding the law and the
application of the law.147 The court noted that not all distinctions
based on sex violate Title IX.148 For example, it does not violate
Title IX for an educational institution receiving federal funds to
maintain “separate living facilities for the different sexes.”149 The
court cited extensively 34 Code of Federal Regulations §106.33
(“§106.33”) which allows “separate toilet, locker room, and
shower facilities on the basis of sex, but such facilities provided for

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 717.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 718.
See id.
G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d. at 718.
Id.
Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1686).
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students of one sex shall be comparable to such facilities provided
for students of the other sex.”150
However, how is §106.33 to be interpreted and applied? Is the
language ambiguous or unambiguous and if so, what difference does it
make? In an opinion letter, dated January 7, 2015, the Department of
Education’s Office of Civil Rights construed how §106.33 should be
applied to transgender individuals.151 According to the opinion letter:
“When a school elects to separate or treat students differently on the basis
of sex, in those situations, a school generally must treat transgender
students consistent with their gender identity.”152 Notably, at the original
trial, the district court failed to follow the Department of Education’s
interpretation of §106.33 and instead found that the regulation was
unambiguous because “‘it clearly allows the School Board to limit
bathroom access on the basis of sex,’ including birth or biological sex.”153
Conversely, the Department of Education contended that §106.33 was
ambiguous because it was silent as to the meaning of the phrases “students
of one sex” and “students of the other sex” in the context of transgender
students.154
The court in G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board indicated that if
it found the regulation to be unambiguous, as held by the district court, the
Department of Education’s interpretation would not be given Auer
deference.155 Therefore, the court began its analysis by first determining
whether §106.33 actually contained an ambiguity.156
The Court of Appeals determined that the regulation §106.33 allows
schools to exclude males from female facilities and vice versa.157
However, the appellate court noted that the regulation did not determine
whether a transgender individual would be a male or female “for purposes
of access to sex-segregated bathrooms.”158 Thus, the appellate court
determined that the regulation had more than one valid reading as to the

150. Id. (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 106.33).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 715, 718; see also Letter From James A. Ferg-Cardima, Acting Deputy
Assistance Secretary for Policy, United States Department of Education Office of Civil
Rights, to Emily T. Prince, Esq. (Jan. 7, 2015) available at http://www.bricker.com/docume
nts/misc/transgender_student_restroom_access_1-2015.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2017).
153. G.G., 822 F.3d. at 718 (quoting G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. 132
F. Supp. 3d 736 (E.D. Va. 2015), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir.
2016)).
154. Id. at 719.
155. Auer deference means that the agency is given deference in interpreting its
regulations. G.G., 822 F.3d. at 720; see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) (holding
that when an agency interprets its own regulation it is entitled to near-absolute deference
unless it “is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation”).
156. G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d. at 720.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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meaning of the “maleness or femaleness.”159 As such, the court found the
regulation to be ambiguous as applied to transgender individuals.160
Since the Court of Appeals determined that the regulation was
ambiguous as applied to transgender individuals, the Department of
Education’s interpretation would be given deference unless the School
Board could show that the Department of Education’s interpretation was
“plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation or statute,”161 and that
the deference was unreasonable. The appellate court noted at the time Title
IX was adopted in 1975, there were two dictionary definitions and
interpretations of the word “sex.”162 According to the first definition, the
word “sex” means “‘the character of being either male or female’ or ‘the
sum of those anatomical and physiological differences with reference to
which the male and female are distinguished.’”163 According to the second
definition the word “sex” is described as:
The sum of the morphological, physiological and behavioral
peculiarities of living beings that subserves biparental reproduction
with its concomitant genetic segregation and recombination which
underlie most evolutionary change, that in its typical dichotomous
occurrence is usually genetically controlled and associated with
special sex chromosomes and that is typically manifested as
maleness and femaleness.164
Although the appellate court’s majority reasoned that these two
definitions suggest that at the time Title IX was enacted, the term “sex”
was understood to denote a male, and was mainly based on biological sex,
these classic definitions were not the only way that the term “sex” could be
defined.165
In addition, to warrant deference to the Department of Education’s
interpretation of §106.33 for transgender individuals, the interpretation had
to be reasonable.166 In determining whether this interpretation was
reasonable, the court looked at the Department of Education’s position on
transgender individuals and found it to have been consistently enforced
since 2014.167 Furthermore, the Department’s position that maleness and
femaleness is determined by one’s gender was in line with existing
guidance and regulations of various federal agencies, including the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”); the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”); the Department of
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 721 (citing Auer, 519 U.S. at 461).
Id.
Id. (quoting American College Dictionary 1109 (1970)).
Id. (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2081 (1971)).
Id.
G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d. at 721.
Id.
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Housing and Urban Development, and the Office of Personnel
Management.168 On this basis, the majority of the appellate court
determined that the Department of Education’s interpretation of §106.33, as
it relates to bathroom access by transgender individuals, was entitled to
deference and should be the controlling weight in the case.169 Accordingly,
the court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Grimm’s Title IX
claim.170
B. THE TITLE VII CLAIM - EMPLOYMENT

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, that provides in pertinent part
that “it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin,” addresses discrimination in the

168. Id.; see also Lusardi v. McHugh, Appeal No. 0120133395 (E.E.O.C. 2013), available
at http://transgenderlawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/EEOC-Lusardi-Decision.pdf
(holding that the employer’s decision to prevent the transgender employee from using the
restroom based on her gender identity violated Title VII). In May 2016, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission published a fact sheet titled Bathroom Access for
Transgender Employees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 addressing
transgender employees’ rights in the workplace and reiterating its conclusion reached in the
Lusardi case. Fact Sheet: Bathroom Access for Transgender Employees under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, https://w
ww.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-bathroom-access-transgender.cfm (last visited Oct. 7,
2017). In June 2015, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration provided guidance
to employers through a publication titled a Guide to Restroom Access for Transgender
Workers that stated the following: “The core belief underlying these policies is that all
employees should be permitted to use the facilities that correspond with their gender
identity. For example, a person who identifies as a man should be permitted to use men’s
restrooms, and a person who identifies as a woman should be permitted to use women’s
restrooms. The employee should determine the most appropriate and safest option for himor herself.” Best Practices: A Guide to Restroom Access for Transgender Workers, United
States Department of Labor: Occupational Safety and Health Administration, https://
www.osha.gov/Publications/OSHA3795.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2017); Guidance
Regarding the Employment of Transgender Individuals in the Federal Workplace, U.S.
Office of Personnel Management, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/diversityand-inclusion/reference-materials/gender-identity-guidance/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2017)
(stating that for “a transitioning employee, this means that, once he or she has begun
working in the gender that reflects his or her gender identity, agencies should allow access
to restrooms and (if provided to other employees) locker room facilities consistent with his
or her gender identity”); “HUD assumes that a recipient or a sub-recipient (‘provider’) that
makes decisions about eligibility or placement into single-sex emergency shelters or
facilities will place a potential client (or a current client seeking a new assignment) in a
shelter or a facility that corresponds to the gender with which the person identifies, taking
health and safety into consideration.” Appropriate Placement for Transgender Persons in
Single-Sex Emergency Shelters and Other Facilities, Notice CPD-15-02, U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development (2015) available at https://www.hudexchange.info/
resources/documents/Notice-CPD-15-02-Appropriate-Placement-for-Transgender-Personsin-Single-Sex-Emergency-Shelters-and-Other-Facilities.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2017).
169. G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d. at 723.
170. Id.
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workplace.171
To establish a prima facie case of employment
discrimination under Title VII, the plaintiff must be established that he or
she “(1) is a member of a protected class; (2) suffered an adverse
employment action; (3) was qualified for the position in question; and (4)
was treated differently from similarly situated individuals outside of his
protected class.”172 The following cases are of interest and help to
understand the application of this law when a plaintiff files a Title VII
claim against an employer for failing to allow the use of a bathroom based
on gender identity.
1. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority
In Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority173 the plaintiff, Krystal Etsitty, a
female transgender individual, sued Utah Transit Authority because she
was allegedly terminated for failure to “conform to their expectations of
stereotypical male behavior.”174 Both parties filed for summary judgment.
Etsitty was born as a biological male, but identified as a woman and
dressed as a female outside of work.175 Diagnosed with gender dysphoria,
Etsitty began taking female hormones.176 A few years later, she applied for
and received a position as a bus operator with the UTA.177 During the
training period, Etsitty presented herself as a male and used the male
bathrooms.178 Shortly thereafter, she met with her supervisor informing
him that she was transgender and would begin appearing at work as a
female.179 Initially, her supervisor expressed support for Etsitty and
indicated that there should be no problem with her transgender status.180
Following this meeting with her supervisor, Etsitty began wearing makeup,
jewelry, and acrylic nails to work and began using the female bathrooms
while on her route.181 Along the route, bus operators have permission to
use the bathrooms of selected businesses but that right is revocable.182
Subsequently, Betty Shirley, the operations manager of the UTA
division where Etsitty worked, became concerned about the bathroom
Etsitty would be using, male or female, and spoke to Bruce Cardon, a
human resource generalist for Shirley’s division.183 Afterwards, a meeting

171. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
172. Perry v. McGinnis, 209 F.3d 597, 601 (6th Cir. 2000); Smith v. City of Salem, 378
F.3d 566, 570 (6th Cir. 2004).
173. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).
174. Id. at 1218.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1218–19.
178. Id. at 1219.
179. Id.
180. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d at 1219.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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was set up with Etsitty to discuss the matter.184 At the meeting, concern
was expressed and questions posed as to whether Etsitty would switch back
and forth between the male and female bathroom, especially since she had
not undergone a sex-change operation.185 After the meeting, Etsitty was
placed on administrative leave and ultimately terminated.186 One reason
advanced for Etsitty’s termination was the potential liability for UTA
“from co-workers, customers, and the general public” resulting from
Etsitty’s usage of the female bathroom.187
To support her claim of sex discrimination pursuant to Title VII, Etsitty
presented two separate legal theories.188 Under the first theory, she alleged
she suffered sex discrimination based on her status as a transgender.189
Under the second theory, she alleged she suffered sex discrimination
because she failed to conform to sex stereotypes.190
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit first
addressed whether transgender status is a protected class under Title VII.191
Since this appellate court had never addressed this question, it relied on a
line of other court decisions that have held that transgender status is not a
protected class under the law.192 Based on this reliance, the court
concluded that Etsitty’s first legal theory, sex discrimination based on her
transgender status, failed.193
The appellate court next addressed Etsitty’s second legal theory that
she suffered from sex discrimination because she failed to conform to the
social stereotypes about how a man should act or appear.194 On this issue,
the appellate court assumed that Etsitty had satisfied her prima facie burden
under the Price Waterhouse theory of gender stereotyping, thereby shifting
the burden to UTA to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
Etsitty’s termination.195 Recall, UTA’s reason for termination was based
on the potential liability it faced because Etsitty intended to use the female
bathroom.196 Clearly, it would not always be possible to accommodate
Etsitty’s bathroom preference because UTA drivers, like Etsitty, typically
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1221.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. (citing Ulane v. E. Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v.
Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977)) (“A transsexual individual’s decision to undergo sex
change surgery does not bring that individual, nor transsexuals as a class, within the scope
of Title VII. This court refuses to extend the coverage of Title VII to situations that
Congress clearly did not contemplate.”).
193. Id. at 1222.
194. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d at 1222–23.
195. Id. at 1224.
196. Id.
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use public bathrooms along their routes rather than bathrooms at the UTA
facility.197 In response, Etsitty argued that basing her termination on her
intent to use the female bathroom “is essentially another way of stating that
she was terminated for failing to conform to sex stereotypes.”198
The appellate court disagreed with Etsitty and concluded that the
UTA’s concern constituted a nondiscriminatory, legitimate reason for
termination.199 According to the court, “Title VII’s prohibition on sex
discrimination, however, does not extend so far [and] . . . [u]sing the
bathroom designated for the opposite sex does not constitute a . . . failure to
conform to sex stereotypes.”200
Since the appellate court concluded that the UTA had provided a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Etsitty’s termination, the burden
shifted to Etsitty to show there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the proffered reason was a pretext which would preclude summary
judgment sought by both parties.201 Etsitty contended that a rational jury
could conclude that she was terminated because she did not act and appear,
as the UTA believed a man should, and she pointed to evidence in the
record, including the deposition testimony of the UTA employees who
expressed concern about Etsitty using the bathroom.202 Specifically, Etsitty
pointed to Shirley’s statements that: “We both felt that there was an image
out there for us, that we could have a problem with having someone who,
even though his appearance may look female, he’s still a male because he
still has a penis.”203 Additionally, Etsitty pointed to Cardon’s statements
that: “We have expectations of operators and how they appear to the public
if we see something that is considered radical or could be interpreted by the
public as being inappropriate, we talk to the operators about that and expect
them to have a professional appearance.”204
After a complete review of the deposition testimony, the appellate
court concluded that these statements did not provide sufficient evidence of
pretext to preclude summary judgment in favor of UTA.205 To support this
position, the appellate court pointed to Shirley’s statements after she
mentioned Etsitty’s appearance.206 In those statements, Shirley explained
that the problem with Etsitty’s appearance was that Etsitty may not be able
to find a unisex bathroom on the route, thereby exposing UTA to
liability.207 Moreover, the court observed that when Cardon was asked

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1225.
Id.
Id.
Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d at 1225.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1225–26.
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what he found unprofessional about Etsitty’s appearance, he responded
with concerns about her bathroom selection.208 Thus, the court concluded
that, when the deposition testimony of Shirley and Cardon were read in
their entirety and in context, it provided additional proof that the UTA did
not terminate Etsitty because she failed to conform with gender
stereotypes.209 Instead, the court determined that the testimony proved that
the UTA terminated Etsitty because she was a biological male who
intended to use the women’s public bathroom.210 Based on the evidence,
the court affirmed the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment
in favor of the UTA on Etsitty’s Title VII claim.211
2. Roberts v. Clark County School District
The case of Roberts v. Clark County School District also involved a
transgender employee who brought a Title VII claim after being denied the
right to use the bathroom based on his gender identity.212 The plaintiff,
Bradley Roberts, a transgender police officer with the Clark County School
District in Nevada, was born female but identified as a male.213 His
employment with the school district began in 1992 and continued without
any incident until he began dressing as a male for work in 2011.214 At that
time, he also began using the men’s bathroom at work.215 When others
complained, Roberts’ commanding officers scheduled a meeting with
him.216 During the meeting, Roberts was informed that he could no longer
use the men’s bathroom and he should “confine himself to the gender
neutral bathrooms to avoid any further complaints.”217
In response, Roberts sent a letter to his superior explaining that he was
changing his name to Bradley; he wanted his coworkers to use male
pronouns when referring to him; and he wanted to use the men’s
bathroom.218 A meeting to discuss the matter was held in November 2011,
and at that time, it was decided that Roberts could be referred to as a man
but was not allowed to use the men’s or women’s bathroom.219 Instead, he
had to use a gender-neutral or single occupancy bathroom until he could
provide documentation of a sex change.220 Roberts’ lawsuit alleging a
violation of Title VII followed.221
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id. at 1226.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1227.
Roberts v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 215 F.Supp.3d 1001 (D. Nev. 2016).
Id.
Id. at 1004–05.
Id. at 1005.
Id.
Id.
Roberts v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 215 F.Supp.3d at 1005.
Id. at 1005–06.
Id.
Id.
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On his Title VII claim, the United States District Court of Nevada
answered the question of whether Title VII’s protection against sex
discrimination includes protection for gender identity.222 In answering this
question and in support of its decision, the district court cited the Ninth
Circuit’s unpublished decision in Kastl v. Maricopa County Community
College District. The 2004 decision in Kastl signaled the direction of the
Ninth Circuit’s position in transgender Title VII cases.223 Notably, the
Kastl case, previously mentioned in this article, involved a transgender
adjunct instructor who sued the Estrella Mountain Community College
after she was banned from the women’s bathroom.224 In Kastl, the Ninth
Circuit found a prima facie case of gender discrimination on “the theory
that impermissible gender stereotypes were a motivating factor” in the
community college’s actions against the transgender instructor.225
The district court in Roberts also referenced the Ninth Circuit’s
decision Schwenk v. Hartford.226 The Schwenk court expanded the analysis
of Title VII and struggled with question of whether the Gender Motivated
Violence Act (“GMVA”) covered transgender individuals.227 The Act
provides a federal protected civil-rights cause of action for victims of
gender-motivated violence.228 The Act also protects men who were
sexually assaulted by other men.229 The Schwenk court examined the term
“sex” under Title VII and found that it encompasses “both sex—that is,
biological differences between men and women—and gender,” a term
which was used to “refer to an individual's sexual identity.”230
Additionally, the district court found that the GMVA parallels Title VII,
which means that like Title VII, the GMVA prohibits discrimination based
on a person’s gender identity.231 Based on Schwenk, the district court in
Roberts reasoned that the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit would likely hold that gender-identity discrimination is actionable
under Title VII.232
Accordingly, the district court in Roberts held that discrimination based
on a person’s gender identity violates Title VII discrimination because it

222. Id. at 1011.
223. Id. at 1012–13 (citing Kastl v. Maricopa County Community College District, 325
F.App’x 492 (9th Cir. 2009)).
224. It should be noted that the court granted the community college’s motion for
summary judgment because the employee failed to provide sufficient evidence that the
community college’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for denying her the right to use
the women’s restroom was a pretext. Kastl, 325 F.App’x at 493.
225. See id.
226. Id. at 1014 (citing Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000)).
227. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202.
231. Id.
232. Roberts, 215 F.Supp.3d at 1014.
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amounts to sexual discrimination.233 The district court explained that the
Roberts’ employer, the Clark County School District, did not challenge
Roberts regarding all of the four necessary elements of a prima facie case
of discrimination, but merely challenged: (1) whether he had actually
suffered an adverse employment action and (2) whether the employer
treated him differently than a similarly situated employee who did not
belong to the same protected class.234
On the question of whether banning Roberts from the bathroom was an
adverse employment action, the court concluded that it was.235 In reaching
this conclusion, the district court referenced and adopted the EEOC’s
decision in Lusardi v. McHugh.236 In Lusardi, the EEOC addressed the
issue of whether a transgender employee proved that she was subjected to
disparate treatment and harassment based on sex when her employer, the
U.S. Army Aviation and Research Development and Engineering Center,
among other things, restricted her from using the common female
bathroom.237 The EEOC concluded that the employer’s decision to prevent
Lusardi from using the bathroom based on her gender identity violated
Title VII.238 The EEOC explained that “[e]qual access to bathrooms is a
significant, basic condition of employment” and concluded that segregating
bathroom access based on a person’s transgender status constitutes a
significant harm for transgender individuals.239
On the question of whether the school district treated Roberts
differently than similarly situated employees, the district court also
affirmed.240 The court based its decision on evidence that Roberts was not
allowed to use the female bathroom, which meant that he was treated
differently than other females.241 Further, the court concluded that the
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1015; see also Cornwell v. Electra Central Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1028
(9th Cir. 2006) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973))
(“To state a prima facie claim for discrimination, the plaintiff must show that (1) he belongs
to a protected class, (2) performed his job satisfactorily, (3) he suffered an adverse
employment action, and (4) the employer treated him differently than a similarly situated
employee who does not belong to the same protected class.”).
235. Roberts, 215 F.Supp.3d at 1015.
236. Id.
237. The EEOC “is responsible for enforcing federal laws that make it illegal to
discriminate against a job applicant or an employee because of the person’s race, color,
religion, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin,
age (40 or older), disability or genetic information.” Overview, U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/index.cfm (last visited on July 31,
2017); see also, Lusardi v. McHugh, Appeal No. 0120133395 (E.E.O.C. 2013), http://trans
genderlawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/EEOC-Lusardi-Decision.pdf.
238. Overview, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, https://www.eeoc.gov
/eeoc/index.cfm (last visited July 31, 2017); see also Lusardi v. McHugh, Appeal No.
0120133395 (E.E.O.C. 2013), http://transgenderlawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/
EEOC-Lusardi-Decision.pdf.
239. Roberts, 215 F.Supp.3d at 1015.
240. Id. at 28.
241. Id.
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school district failed to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
the bathroom ban. Thus, the court granted summary judgment in Roberts’s
favor on the question of whether the school district discriminated against
Roberts under Title VII.242

IV. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS WHEN ENACTING
BIOLOGY-BASED LAWS
Only a handful of cases have dealt with transgender bathroom laws and
these cases have resulted in inconsistent holdings. As such, it is difficult,
likely impossible in most cases, to determine how a court will hold when
confronted with transgender bathroom policies or laws in both the public
educational and employment sectors.243
Albeit few in numbers, an examination of federal cases that have been
decided can reasonably highlight facts and factors to consider when a state
is contemplating whether to enact biology-based or gender-identity based
transgender bathroom laws for students and employees.
A. THE EDUCATIONAL SECTOR

Let’s compare the facts in Johnston v. University of Pittsburg of the
Commonwealth System of Higher Education with those in G.G. v.
Gloucester County School Board.244 First, let’s examine the type of setting.
The Johnston case involved a transgender college student in Pittsburg,
Pennsylvania, who enrolled in the school as a female, but held himself out
to be a male throughout his entire tenure at the university.245 Next, let’s
examine the response from the school when they became aware of the
issue. In Johnston, after the student informed the post-secondary school of
his transgender status, the school did not support the right of the student to
use the bathroom based on his gender identity.246 Despite this fact, the
student continued to use the men’s bathroom and locker rooms and was
even sanctioned for his failure to comply with the school’s request to stop
using these facilities.247
Comparatively, G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board involved a
transgender student who was diagnosed with gender dysphoria and
attended a secondary school in Gloucester, Virginia.248 He was not a
college student as in Johnston. And unlike the college in Johnston, when
the high school student and his mother informed the school of his
242. Using the same analysis, the court concluded that the school district in precluding
Roberts from using the male and female restrooms also violated N.R.S. 613.330, which
prevents employers from discriminating against employees based on gender identity. Id. at
*29.
243. See supra notes 94-171.
244. See id.
245. See supra notes 94-125.
246. See supra notes 94-125.
247. Id.
248. See supra notes 126-171.

3 - FLEMMING_MACRO_REDLINE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Summer 2018]

TRANSGENDER BATHROOM LAWS

5/31/2018 4:22 PM

189

transgender status, the school initially allowed him to use the boy’s
bathroom and only back peddled on it its decision after receiving negative
publicity.249 It seems ironic that the secondary school in G.G. v. Gloucester
County School Board—where students are younger and more impressible
students—was initially more supportive of a gender identity-based
bathroom choice than the post-secondary school in the Johnston case—
where the students are older and less impressionable.250
The court’s conclusions in the two cases were very different.251 The
court in Johnston, decided on the district court level that preventing the
college level transgender student from using the men’s bathroom did not
violate Title IX, whereas the appellate court in G.G. v. Gloucester County
School Board concluded that preventing the secondary education level
transgender student from using the boy’s bathroom violated Title IX.252
These very different decisions were reached based on completely different
analysis by the courts in these cases.253
The Johnston holding that Title XI is not violated when a transgender
student is denied the right to use a bathroom because of a biology-based
policy was decided in March 2015 without any consideration of the
Department of Education’s January 7, 2015, letter stating that transgender
students should be allowed to use the bathroom or other public facilities
based on the gender identity.254 Instead, the district court in Johnston used
as guidance the Eighth Circuit’s Title VII cases, including Sommers v.
Budget Marketing, Inc., holding that transgender employees are not
protected under Title VII.255 Further, the Johnston court determined that
the student had not sufficiently alleged sex discrimination based on sex
stereotyping.256 The district court’s conclusion was based on its finding
that the student did not claim that the university discriminated against him
because of the way he looked, acted or spoke and he never alleged that the
university harassed him.257 The district court found that the student’s only
allegation was that he was denied the right to use the bathroom based on
his gender identity, which in the court’s opinion was not enough to
constitute a sex-stereotyping claim.258
In contrast, G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board was decided in
2016. Unlike the district court in Johnston, the appellate court in G.G. v.
Gloucester County School Board considered the Department of
Education’s January 7, 2015, letter and used it as a basis for determining

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id.
Id.
See supra notes 94-171.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 94-125.
See id; see also, Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982).
See supra notes 94-125.
Id.
See supra notes 94-125.
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whether the biology-based bathroom laws violated the transgender
student’s Title IX rights.259 On May 13, 2016, approximately one month
after the G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board case was decided,
President Barack Obama provided further guidance to public schools and
universities grappling with the issue of whether to allow transgender
students to use public bathrooms or facilities based on their biology or their
gender identity.260
Specifically, in a joint letter from the Department of Justice and the
Department of Education, the Obama administration made it clear that
students in schools should be allowed to use the bathroom based on their
gender identity.261 This letter, in pertinent part, stated that: “When a school
provides sex-segregated activities and facilities, transgender students must
be allowed to participate in such activities and access such facilities
consistent with their gender identity.”262
Thereafter, failing to prevail at the appellate level, the Gloucester
County School Board petitioned the Supreme Court to hear the case, and
the Court granted the school board’s writ of certiorari on October 28,
2016.263 However, in January 2017 a new United States president was
sworn into office and on February 22, 2017, the newly elected President,
Donald Trump, revoked the federal guidelines issued under the Obama
administration that protected transgender students.
The revocation
effectively placed in the hands of the states and school districts the decision
of whether or not transgender students should have access to bathrooms
based on their gender identity.264
259. See supra notes 126-171.
260. Emanuella Grinberg, Feds Issue Guidance on Transgender Access to Public
Restrooms, CNN, May 14, 2016, available at http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/12/politics/trans
gender-bathrooms-obama-administration/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2017); Julie Hirschfeld Davis
& Matt Apuzzo, U.S. Directs Public Schools to Allow Access to Restrooms, N.Y. TIMES,
May 12, 2016, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/13/us/politics/obama-administ
ration-to-issue-decree-on-transgender-access-to-school-restrooms.html?r=0 (last visited Oct.
7, 2017).
261. Letter from Department of Justice, Office for Civil Rights and Department of
Education, Office of Civil Rights (May 13, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/
file/850986/download (last visited Oct. 17, 2017).
262. Id.
263. See, Gloucester County School Board v. G.G., 137 S. Ct. 369 (Oct. 28, 2016).
264. In November 2016, Republican candidate Donald J. Trump won the presidential
election beating Democratic candidate Hillary Rodham Clinton. See Matt Flegenheimer &
Michael Barbaro, Donald Trump is Elected President in Stunning Repudiation of the
Establishment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2016, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/
09/us/politics/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-president.html (last visited July 26, 2017)
(“Donald John Trump was elected the 45th president of the United States on Tuesday in a
stunning culmination of an explosive, populist and polarizing campaign that took relentless
aim at the institutions and long-held ideals of American democracy.”); Letter from
Department of Justice, Office for Civil Rights (Feb. 22, 2017), available at http://i2.cdn.
turner.com/cnn/2017/images/02/23/1atransletterpdf022317.pdf (last visited Jul. 24, 2017);
see also, Greg Toppo, Trump Administration Pulls Transgender Restroom Rules; It Should
Be Up to States to Decide Issue, White House Says, USA TODAY, Feb. 23, 2017, at 3A

3 - FLEMMING_MACRO_REDLINE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Summer 2018]

TRANSGENDER BATHROOM LAWS

5/31/2018 4:22 PM

191

This revocation of federal guidelines was articulated in a joint letter
from the Department of Education and the Department of Justice.265 The
joint letter from the Trump administration specifically withdrew the
Department of Education’s January 7, 2015, letter and the joint letter from
the Department of Education and the Department of Justice dated May 13,
2016.266 At the time of the Trump administration’s letter dated February
22, 2017, the G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board case was still before
the Supreme Court.267 Based on the Trump administration letter, the
Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case back to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to decide the case, without
consideration of the Department of Education’s January 7, 2015, letter.268
On August 2, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit remanded the case to the district court for this court to decide
whether the case is moot since the high school student graduated in June
2017.269 If the district court determines that the case is moot, there will be
no decision in the case. If the district court decides that the case is not
moot, the Court of Appeals will have to decide the case without the
Department of Education’s January 7, 2015, letter.
Without this letter, there will be no interpretation by the Department of
Education as to the meaning of how §106.33, allowing “separate toilet,
locker room, and shower facilities on the basis of sex” should be
interpreted for transgender students. Consequently, it is very possible that
the ordinary definition of the term “sex” based on one’s biological sex at
birth will be used to define the term.270 Moreover, given the current
(“The Trump administration withdrew guidelines outlining which restrooms transgender
students can use, potentially sowing confusion in schools, angering LGBTQ rights groups
and adding uncertainty to a widely discussed case due to come before the U.S. Supreme
Court next month.”); Ariane de Vogue, Mary Kay Mallonee & Emanuella Grinberg, Trump
Administration Withdraws Federal Protection for Transgender Students, CNN, Feb. 23,
2017, available at http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/22/politics/doj-withdraws-federal-protectio
ns-on-transgender-bathrooms-in-schools/ (last visited July 20, 2017) (“The Trump
administration on Wednesday night withdrew Obama-era protections for transgender
students in public schools that let them use bathrooms and facilities corresponding with their
gender identity.”); Jeremy W. Peters, Jo Becker & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Rescinds
Rules on Bathroom for Transgender Students, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2017, available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/22/us/politics/devos-sessions-transgender-students-right
s.html (last visited on July 20, 2017) (“In a joint letter, the top civil rights officials from the
Justice Department and the Education Department rejected the Obama administration’s
position that nondiscrimination laws require schools to allow transgender students to use the
bathrooms of their choice.”).
265. See Letter from Department of Justice, Office for Civil Rights (Feb. 22, 2017),
available at http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2017/images/02/23/1atransletterpdf022317.pdf
(last visited July 24, 2017).
266. Id.
267. See Gloucester County Sch. Bd. v. G. G., 2017 U.S. LEXIS 1626 (U.S., Mar. 6,
2017).
268. Id.
269. Gloucester County Sch. Bd. v. G. G., 869 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 2017).
270. See supra notes 126-171.
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political climate in the federal government to limit the rights of transgender
students, it is very possible that the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit may find that the Gloucester County School Board’s
biology-based transgender bathroom policy does not violate Title IX.271
Furthermore, it is very likely that when states impose biology-based
transgender bathroom policies for students, conservative courts may find
that these laws do not violate Title IX.
However, the victory is not completely won by proponents for biologybased bathroom policies and laws. If states adopt biology-based bathroom
policies for students, there still may be potential liability under Title IX
based on the theory of sex stereotyping, a claim articulated in the Price
Waterhouse case.272 As previously mentioned, this case involved an
accountant who was denied a job because she was “too macho” and was
told that she needed to “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress
more femininely, wear makeup, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”273
In essence, the accountant was denied the position because she did not fit
the gender stereotypes of a female.274 The Supreme Court in Price
Waterhouse held that “an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a
woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis
of gender” in violation of the law.275
Although the United States Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse did not
specifically address a transgender individual, the United Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit addressed this specific issue in Smith v. City of
Salem.276 This case involved a transgender firefighter who was forced to
resign and later brought a Title VII sex-stereotyping claim against her
employer.277 The appellate court concluded that the employee had a
cognizable claim under Title VII.278 In reaching, this holding the court
stated the following:
. . . discrimination against a plaintiff who is a transsexual—and
therefore fails to act and/or identify with his or her gender—is no
different from the discrimination directed against Ann Hopkins in
Price Waterhouse, who, in sex-stereotypical terms, did not act like
a woman. Sex stereotyping based on a person's gender nonconforming behavior is impermissible discrimination, irrespective
of the cause of that behavior; a label, such as “transsexual,” is not
fatal to a sex discrimination claim where the victim has suffered

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

See id.
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (1998).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Smith, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
Smith, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
Id.
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discrimination because of his or her gender non-conformity.279
In essence, the appellate court in Smith determined that a sex
stereotyping claim may also exists for transgender individuals if an adverse
action is taken against them because they fail to act according to certain
preconceived notions about how a particular gender should act.
This means that when states consider adopting biology-based
transgender bathroom policies for students, they should be aware that in
some jurisdictions this type of policy or law may be viewed as a form of
sex stereotyping or a means of discriminating against individuals because
of their failure to conform to preconceived notions about their biological
sex.280 In those jurisdictions, a biology-based transgender bathroom policy
would illegally violate Title IX.281 Thus, states in these jurisdictions should
be wary about enacting biology-based transgender bathroom policies as
these laws could potentially expose schools to legal liability.
B. THE EMPLOYMENT SECTOR

First, before analyzing the employment cases discussed in this article, it
should be noted that on December 15, 2014, the Obama administration
issued a memorandum stating that “Title VII's prohibition of sex
discrimination . . . encompasses discrimination based on gender identity,
including transgender status.”282 Subsequently, at least two federal
agencies—the EEOC and the OSHA—provided guidance to employers on
the rights of transgender employees to use public bathrooms or facilities.283
Specifically, in May 2016, the EEOC published a fact sheet titled
Bathroom Access for Transgender Employees under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 addressing transgender employees’ rights in the
workplace and reiterating its conclusion reached in the Lusardi v. McHugh
case, holding that an employer’s decision to prevent a transgender
employee from using the bathroom based on her gender identity violated

279. Id. at 575.
280. Compare Roberts v. Clark Cnty Sch. Dist., 215 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1010 (D. Nev.,
Nov. 28, 2016) with Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d at 1219 (Etsitty argued that
terminating her because she was going to use the female restroom was a form of sex
stereotyping or was based on her failure to conform to gender stereotypes of a male.)
281. See Roberts v. Clark County School District, 215 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1010 (D. Nev.,
Nov. 28, 2016).
282. See Treatment of Transgender Employment Discrimination Claims Under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, (Op. Att’y Gen. Dec. 15, 2014), available at https://www.just
ice.gov/file/188671/download (last visited Oct. 12, 2017).
283. See infra notes 237-240; see also Guidance Regarding the Employment of
Transgender Individuals in the Federal Workplace issued by the U.S. Office of Personnel
Management, OPM.GOV, available at https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/diversit
y-and-inclusion/reference-materials/gender-identity-guidance/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2017)
(stating that for “a transitioning employee, this means that, once he or she has begun
working in the gender that reflects his or her gender identity, agencies should allow access
to restrooms and (if provided to other employees) locker room facilities consistent with his
or her gender identity”).
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Title VII.284
Also, in June 2015, the OSHA provided guidance to employers through
a publication titled a Guide to Bathroom Access for Transgender Workers
that stated the following:
The core belief underlying these policies is that all employees
should be permitted to use the facilities that correspond with their
gender identity. For example, a person who identifies as a man
should be permitted to use men’s bathrooms, and a person who
identifies as a woman should be permitted to use women’s
bathrooms. The employee should determine the most appropriate
and safest option for him- or herself.285
In essence, the OSHA’s position is that transgender employees should
be allowed to use the bathroom based on their gender identity.286
However, on October 4, 2017, the Trump administration reversed the
Obama administration’s memorandum dated December 15, 2016, by
issuing a memorandum stating that “Title VII’s prohibition against sex
discrimination encompasses discrimination between men and women but
does not encompass discrimination based on gender identity per se,
including transgender status.”287 Similar to rights of transgender students,
284. Fact Sheet: Bathroom Access for Transgender Employees under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, available at https://
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-bathroom-access-transgender.cfm (last visited Oct. 17,
2017) (In May 2016, the EEOC published a fact sheet titled Bathroom Access for
Transgender Employees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 addressing
transgender employees’ rights in the workplace and reiterating its conclusion reached in the
Lusardi case.); see also, Lusardi v. McHugh, Appeal No. 0120133395, available at
http://op.bna.com.s3.amazonaws.com/eg.nsf/id/pdon9velpx/%24File/lusardi%20(eeoc%20d
ecision).pdf (last visited Oct. 17. 2017).
285. Guidance Regarding the Employment of Transgender Individuals in the Federal
Workplace issued by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Fact Sheet: Bathroom
Access for Transgender Employees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
available at https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/diversity-and-inclusion/referencematerials/gender-identity-guidance/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2017).
286. “With the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Congress created the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to assure safe and healthful
working conditions for working men and women by setting and enforcing standards and by
providing training, outreach, education and assistance.” About OSHA, United States
Department of Education, available at https://www.osha.gov/about.html (last visited on July
31, 2017); see also, Best Practices: A Guide to Restroom Access for Transgender Workers,
available at https://www.osha.gov/Publications/OSHA3795.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2017).
In June 2015, the OSHA provided guidance to employers through a publication titled a
Guide to Restroom Access for Transgender Workers that stated the following: “The core
belief underlying these policies is that all employees should be permitted to use the facilities
that correspond with their gender identity. For example, a person who identifies as a man
should be permitted to use men’s restrooms, and a person who identifies as a woman should
be permitted to use women’s restrooms. The employee should determine the most
appropriate and safest option for him-or herself.”
287. See Revised Treatment of Transgender Employment Discrimination Claims (Op.
Att’y Gen. Oct. 17, 2017), available at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/406743
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the federal government has attempted to limit the rights of transgender
employees. Presently, the federal administrative guidelines from the EEOC
and OSHA remain unchanged. The question of whether biology-based
transgender bathroom laws violate Title VII remains, but the answer to the
question is as muddy as the great Mississippi River.
Indeed, the ultimate determination of the question of whether biologybased transgender bathroom laws and policies for employees violate Title
VII is the United States Supreme Court. However, until the Supreme Court
decides this matter, the question will remain a topic of much debate. Since
this question has yet to be decided, perhaps a comparison of the handful of
federal cases that have addressed this question, will be helpful.
The Etsitty case involved a transgender bus driver who asked to be
allowed to use the female bathrooms during her route.288 In other words,
the employee was not requesting to use the restroom at her place of
employment, but at locations away from her place of employment.289
UTA, the employer of the transgender employee, claimed that it denied the
employee’s request based on its concern for UTA’s potential liability
resulting from the employee’s bathroom use while away from the
employer’s place of business.290
The Roberts case involved a transgender police officer that requested to
use the men’s bathroom at his place of employment.291 Clark County
School District, the employer, denied the employee’s request without any
apparent explanation.292 The courts in Etsitty and Roberts reached very
different conclusions on the question of whether the employers violated
Title VII by preventing the employees from using the bathroom based on
their gender identity.293 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit’s conclusion in Etsitty was that there was no violation of Title VII,
whereas the district court in Roberts concluded that Title VII was
violated.294
Based on these very different conclusions, it appears that an
employer’s liability for biology-based transgender bathroom laws may
depend upon the jurisdiction in which the employment case is instituted.295
For instance, in Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, the lawsuit was filed in
the Tenth Circuit, which is a court that does not extend Title VII
protections to transgender employees.296 On the other hand, the Roberts
case was instituted in the Ninth Circuit, a circuit that would likely extend—

7/Sessions-memo-reversing-gender-identity-civil.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2017).
288. See supra notes 175-212.
289. Id.
290. See supra notes 175-212.
291. See supra notes 213-243.
292. See supra notes 213-243.
293. See supra notes 175-43.
294. Id.
295. See id.
296. See supra notes 175-212.
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as the Roberts Court predicted—Title VII protection to transgender
employees.297
Although the facts of the cases were similar, the courts viewed the
sufficiency of the plaintiff-employee’s evidence differently.298
For
example, in Etsitty, the Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment, concluding that the employee failed to present evidence that the
employer’s nondiscriminatory legitimate reason of not allowing her to use
the bathroom was a pretext.299 On the other hand, in Roberts, the court
concluded that the employee had presented enough evidence to preclude
the defendant-employer from being granted summary judgment on Title
VII.300 Arguably, the different determination of the sufficiency of the
plaintiff-employee’s evidence by each court could be traced to the
difference in protections for transgender employees in the Tenth and Ninth
Circuits.
Currently, it is unclear how a federal court will decide on the issue of
whether state-enacted biology based transgender bathroom laws violates
Title VII. Nevertheless, the review of the existing federal cases reveal that
courts in numerous jurisdictions have expanded the protections of the law
to include transgender status based on the Price Waterhouse sexstereotyping theory.301 It can be argued that currently more courts now find
Title VII protections for transgender employees.302 Nonetheless, this
majority view may not be the view accepted by the Supreme Court when
and if it addresses this issue, given the current political climate on the
297. See supra notes 213-243.
298. See supra notes 175-243.
299. See supra notes 175-212.
300. See supra notes 213-243.
301. See e.g., Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, LLC, 641 Fed. Appx. 883 (11th Cir.
2016) (reversing summary judgment for the employer on the plaintiff’s claim that she was
terminated from her job as an auto mechanic because she is transgender); Doe v. Arizona,
No. CV-15-02399-PHX-DGC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36229 (D. Ariz., Mar. 21, 2016)
(holding discrimination against a transgender employee constitutes sex-based discrimination
under Title VII); Dawson v. H&H Electric., Inc., No. 4:14CV00583 SWW, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 122723 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 15, 2015) (holding that termination of a transgender
employee based on her transgender status constituted sex discrimination under Title VII);
Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir., Apr. 4, 2017)
(en banc) (holding that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex
discrimination in violation of Title VII); Macy v. Holder, App. No. 0120120821, 2012
EEOPUB LEXIS 1181, (EEOC App. 20, 2012) (The EEOC’s holding that Title VII
prohibits workplace discrimination based on gender identity.).
302. See Chai Feldblum, Vulnerable Population: Law, Policies in Practice and Social
Norms: Coverage of Transgender Discrimination under Sex Discrimination Law, 14 J.L.
SOC’Y 1, 24 (2013) (“In one respect, the Commission’s decision in Macy was just the
Commission catching up with federal and state courts that had concluded that the gender
stereotyping theory of Price Waterhouse included protection for transgender individuals
who had been discriminated against on the basis of their transgender status.”); Ilona M.
Turner, Comment, Sex Stereotyping Per Se; Transgender Employees and Title VII, 95 CALIF.
L. REV. 561, 563 (2007) (“The very acts that define transgender people as transgender are
those that contradict stereotypes of gender-appropriate appearance and behavior.”).
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Federal level and the current composition of the Court.
If a court follows what appears to be the majority view applied by
Roberts Court, the court will conclude that biology-based bathroom laws
violate Title VII.303 Thus, if states in the jurisdictions following the
majority view enact transgender bathroom laws for employees, this will
very likely create potential liability for state agencies and governmental
employers.304 In effect, states in these jurisdictions should refrain from
enacting biology-based transgender bathroom laws for employees since
these laws will likely violate Title VII.305
Overall, it appears that employees may have more protections than
students when states adopt biology-based bathroom laws. Indeed, the
federal government no longer has guidelines directing schools to allow
students to use the bathroom based on their gender identity.306 Moreover, a
student’s claim that biology-based transgender bathroom laws violate Title
IX may only exist if the student articulates a sex stereotyping claim and the
case is in a jurisdiction that is willing to recognize such a claim.307
On the other hand, currently, federal guidelines from the EEOC and the
OSHA, directing employers to allow employees to use the bathroom or
public facilities based on their gender identity, still exists. Even more, the
majority view of courts throughout the country appear to support the
interpretation of Title VII protections for transgender employees based on a
sex-stereotyping claim.308 Hence, it seems very likely that when states
enact biology-based bathroom laws for employees, Title VII may be
violated, unless the court follows what appears to be the minority view that
no such protection exists.309
Nevertheless, until more cases and additional guidance is provided,
states should carefully consider whether to enact transgender bathroom
laws in the first place. Yet, if they choose to enact such laws, they should
think twice about imposing biology- based transgender bathroom laws.

V. CONCLUSION
Recently, a few states have enacted transgender bathroom laws based
on an individual’s gender identity.310 On the other hand, numerous states
have considered enacting transgender bathroom laws based on the
individual’s biological sex.311 In fact, the question of whether to enact
gender-identity based bathroom laws or biology-based bathroom laws, have
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

See supra notes 215-245.
See id.
See id.
See supra notes 265-267.
See supra notes 273-281.
See supra notes 213-243.
See supra notes 175-212.
See supra notes 18-31.
See supra notes 32-88.
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arisen in both the public educational and employment sectors. In some
cases, when biology-based laws have been enacted, the results have been
lawsuits filed by students and employees claiming violations of Title IX
and Title VII, respectively. To lessen the potential liability for states and
state agencies, including public schools and governmental employers, these
laws should be based on the individual’s gender identification.

